Montek Singh Ahluwalia - An American spy and economic hit-man: May 2014

I have filed an affidavit in the Delhi High Court in W.P. (Civil) 1280/ 2012.

Along with this affidavit as Annexure P-2, I have filed true copies of two cables sent by the US Embassy in India that describe private non-official discussions and meetings between Montek Singh Ahluwalia and the US Ambassador and other US Embassy and US government officials.

These cables (which constitute only the tip of the iceberg of evidence against Mr Montek Singh Ahluwalia) establish that Montek Singh Ahluwalia is a lobbyist for US interests in India and that he has by wrongfully sharing information with the US Embassy and US Government, violated Section 5 of the Official Secrets Act which is attached.

Not only does Montek Singh Ahluwalia disclose information to US officials in violation of Section 5 of the Official Secrets Act, he also presents himself as an interlocuter and lobbyist for pushing through US interests within the Indian governmental process, and he even advises US officials/ government on how best to achieve US goals within the Indian governmental process. Montek Singh Ahluwalia is therefore misusing his official position within the Government of India to unofficially help and assist the United States government in achieving/ securing US strategic and commercial interests in Indian governmental decision making. Mr Montek Singh Ahluwalia is in these cables described as advising the US government on how to gain an upper hand over Indian bureaucrats and ministers and Indian governmental processes, and in one instance advising on how US educational businesses can break Indian law.

These cables establish that Montek Singh Ahluwalia advises the United States Government against Indian strategic interests in diplomacy and state-to-state relations. This would makes Montek Singh Ahluwalia a
traitor guilty of treason.

This basically means that Montek Singh Ahluwalia is a spy acting for the United States government. That Montek Singh Ahluwalia is a CIA agent/ asset has been publicly articulated by several eminent Indians.

Mr Montek Singh Ahluwalia must be investigated and prosecuted for violation of Section 5 of the Official Secrets Act and the two cables in the attached Annexure P-2 provide sufficient evidence of this, though additional evidence against Mr Montek Singh Ahluwalia can be easily gathered.

Seema Sapra

Annexure P-2

Cable reference id: #07NEWDELHI4272

“All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities.” — “Refus Global“, Paul-Émile Borduas

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Reference id	? aka Wikileaks id #122608
Subject	Ambassador Discusses Ceo Forum Issues With Planning Commission Deputy Chairman Ahluwalia
Origin	Embassy New Delhi (India)
Cable time	Tue, 18 Sep 2007 12:16 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/09/07NEWDELHI4272.html
History	Time unknown: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks Wed, 6 Apr 2011 19:54: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs Fri, 26 Aug 2011 02:34: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies

O 181216Z SEP 07 FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8314 INFO RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI 1496 RUEHCI/AMCONSUL KOLKATA 0853 RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE 4124 RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI 0588 RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC

India

by Energy Deputy Secretary Sell for the APP and Energy Dialogue, and the end of October visit by Treasury Secretary Paulson and NEC Director Hubbard. Ambassador also urged GOI resolution of the outstanding legacy issues of McDermott and Dow Chemical. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) The Ambassador noted that the CEO Forum was unique in that it was one of the few private sector forums that attracted great interest and attendance from senior government officials. It was therefore important that the September 24 discussion focus on critical issues including infrastructure financing and the impact of inadequate IPR protection on foreign investment in India that has lead to the recent decision by the Swiss pharmaceutical company, Novartis, to pull out of India after its latest patent application was denied. Ahluwalia agreed and said that he hoped the U.S.-India civil nuclear agreement would not be on the agenda since the ball was in

India

's court to move forward in a process well known to everyone. Ambassador noted that, at some point, prospects for

U.S.

private sector investment in

India

's civil nuclear industry would be an appropriate discussion topic at the CEO Forum, but not until the Agreement had been operationalized. Ahluwalia said that he would discuss with Foreign Secretary Menon keeping the civil nuclear agreement off the agenda, and Ambassador said that he would take it up with Under Secretary Burns. ¶3. (SBU) The Ambassador said that it might be useful to repeat the formula used in last year's successful CEO Forum by using the lunch to follow up on important economic issues previously raised in the morning meeting, and avoid topics like civil nuclear and the Doha Round that will accomplish little in the short time available. Ahluwalia agreed and said that CII and the Ministry of External Affairs had been discussing with State and the NSC the idea of moving from one large rectangular table to several round tables that would group CEOs and government officials according to their interest in particular issues/topics. Ahluwalia added that the GOI intended to present a 14 point non-paper on progress made and remaining/new issues that could be useful for discussion and follow up after the meeting. Ahluwalia said that Hubbard in a recent phone conversation said that the

U.S.

also intended to raise agricultural/phyto-sanitary concerns. ¶4. (SBU) The Ambassador said that the October 29-30 visit of Treasury Secretary Paulson to

India

presented a great opportunity to focus on creating a climate of finance for infrastructure. He added that Paulson and his team will bring great knowledge and experience on financial market supervision, regulatory issues, securitization, debt, and other key areas. Ahluwalia said that he will be joining the Ambassador in the October 29 Infrastructure Conference in Mumbai that Paulson and Indian Finance Minister Chidambaram will open. Ahluwalia noted that it would be helpful if there was some movement on

U.S.

approval of ICICI's and Bank of India's long-pending U.S. bank branch applications. He added that there was a lot of irritation in MOF over this issue, especially since Secretary Paulson had told Chidambaram a year ago that there would be action. Despite the lack of progress, Ahluwalia noted that MOF had recently approved three new branches in

India

for Citibank. Ambassador responded that the delay was not due to protectionism on the

U.S.

part, but because of regulatory issues that required

India

's establishment of an anti-money laundering/terrorist financing regime (AML/CTF) that meets international standards. The Ambassador noted that

India

had joined the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) as an observer with the goal of full membership, which was a welcome step. Ahluwalia asked for a one page note on outstanding issues related to AML/CTF that he could discuss with Chidambaram before the CEO Forum. ¶5. (SBU) The Ambassador said that Deputy Secretary of Energy Clay Sells will visit

India

in mid-October for the Asia Partnership Program (APP) summit and the U.S.-India Energy Dialogue. He added that Secretary Rice is also considering coming out for the APP. ¶6. (SBU) Aluwalia asked what the key deadlines are for NEW DELHI 00004272 002.2 OF 002 operationalizing the Civil Nuclear Agreement. The Ambassador said that there can be no Congressional vote until

India

has reached agreement first with the IAEA, then the NSG. Given the 90 day Congressional review requirement before a vote is possible,

India

would have to conclude the first two steps by December in order to get a vote in Congress by the end of February. After that, getting it on the Congressional calendar next year would be much more difficult. Ambassador added that the

U.S.

has been very quiet publicly on the Agreement since July in order to avoid "stirring things up" for the GOI as it deals with political debate here. Ahluwalia said that the issue in

India

is who will blink first, Congress or the Left. For the Left, it is clear the issue is not the 123 Agreement, but the deepening U.S.-India relationship which they vehemently oppose. Ahluwalia said that there are two possibilities if Congress calls the Left's bluff: it could continue as a minority government until calling for elections, or the Left could join with the BJP in bringing down the government, leading to elections. In either case, Ahluwalia said the Government is presently in a good political position to go into elections, but it would be better to go to the polls on issues other than the 123 Agreement. ¶7. (SBU) Returning to the CEO Forum, the Ambassador said that McDermott International CEO Nesbitt will be attending and there are reports that the GOI may announce at the Forum that it is taking steps to finally resolve this long outstanding legacy issue. Ambassador cautioned that any action that fell short of expeditiously settling in full the Supreme Court Judgment in favor of McDermott, such as a partial payment through the bankruptcy proceedings, will go down badly and create major ill feelings in the

U.S.

business community. The Ambassador also cited the GOI's continued third party claims against Dow Chemical in the ongoing Bhopal land reclamation lawsuit as a further impediment by Dow and others to invest in India, and he asked that the GOI drop its claims against Dow. Ahluwalia took the Ambassador's points on McDermott, noting the importance of finally putting the issue to rest. On Dow, he said that the GOI does not understand Dow's concern about future civil or criminal liability since the GOI third-party claims do not suggest a GOI presumption that Dow is responsible for the cleanup. The GOI's problem is that the NGOs are very active and vocal in this case, and it is very difficult for the Government to now drop its claims against Dow. The GOI was hoping for a quick resolution of the case which would have settled the issue, but Dow prevented this by asking for a stay in the proceedings. Ahluwalia noted that the issue of whether a company like Dow can be held liable for the actions of another company solely on the basis of acquiring that company after the culpable activity occurred is an important and novel legal issue in

India

that needs to be resolved. Ahluwalia recommended that the Ambassador discuss the issue with Finance Minister Chidambaram - a noted jurist. ¶8. (SBU) Ambassador again stressed the importance of the financial sector in upcoming U.S.-India discussions, noting that a central economic issue for

India

is the long-term status of its financial markets. He added that

India

's financial markets today have the makings for a regional financial center, given

India

's huge hinterland and large and increasing savings rates that mirror the conditions in the

U.S.

banking sector a generation ago. The Ambassador said that virtually all large

U.S.

banks were once domestic-centered, before they went global. Ahluwalia agreed, noting that the GOI (with MOF and Prime Minister approval) had just commissioned a High Level Committee on Financial Sector Reforms, composed mostly of private sector individuals, to make recommendations by next March on next steps in financial sector reform. He added that, until

India

ends the dominance of the State in the banking sector, there will never be a level playing field for private or foreign banks that is necessary if

India

is to establish itself as a regional financial center. MULFORD

Cable reference id: #08NEWDELHI2367

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Reference id	? aka Wikileaks id #168360
Subject	Ambassador Meets With Montek Singh Ahluwalia
Origin	Embassy New Delhi (India)
Cable time	Thu, 4 Sep 2008 00:59 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/09/08NEWDELHI2367.html
History	Time unknown: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies

VZCZCXRO4795 OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHPW DE RUEHNE #2367/01 2480059 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 040059Z SEP 08 FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3233 INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUCNNSG/NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 1623 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 6851

U.S.

had submitted. Ambassador Mulford observed that the surprising number of substantial amendments nearly amounted to a question of good faith, with key NSG members' non-proliferation advocates allowed the upper hand. ¶3. (C) The Ambassador described to Ahluwalia how the meeting in Vienna had 400 people ) minus the Indian delegation that had to remain outside ) with all the chairs facing forward toward the Chairman's desk, in a configuration that discouraged debate and enabled NSG members to offer tough amendments semi-anonymously. Ambassador Mulford also explained to Ahluwalia that in the briefing with the Indian delegation ) primarily Foreign Secretary Meno and Special Envoy Shyan Saran ) during a scheduled break in the NSG Plenary, the Indian side solicited questions from the NSG members. None were offered.

representative John Rood also encouraged the participants to utilize the opportunity to ask questions of the Indian delegation, but no one did. Looking Forward --------------- ¶4. (C) The Ambassador then considered the next steps. He noted that

India

and the

have negotiated a "clean" text, but that he anticipates it will be an extremely hard sell in the next NSG meeting in Vienna on September 4-5. Ambassador Mulford assured Ahluwalia that the

goal was to try to keep the text "sacrosanct," with NSG member concerns limited to comments in the Chairman's Summary. The Ambassador identified several text changes that he thought would be unacceptable: the "multilateralization" of the Hyde Act, and any language that demanded automatic sanctions in response to further nuclear testing. Whether it would be possible to avoid such language, Mulford didn't know. ¶5. (C) Secretary Rice had asked the Ambassador to stay in Delhi during the September 4-5 Vienna Plenary to engage the GoI if needed. Mulford noted that National Security Advisor Narayanan had spoken with him that day and was not happy to learn that the Ambassador would not be in Vienna to help move the deal through. Mulford observed that one of the problems with the NSG meetings was the representational mode )- that NSG members had designated their non-proliferation advocates as participants at the Plenary rather than senior political representatives who could see the big picture at stake. The big issue for the NSG was whether the international nonproliferation system would be stronger with

India

on the inside. The US delegation on September 4-5 would be led by State Department Under Secretary for Political Affairs Bill Burns, which added weight to the meeting. ¶6. (C) Ambassador Mulford apprised Ahluwalia of his discussions with the "Group of Six" like-minded country members of the NSG )

Austria

Ireland

New Zealand

Netherlands

Norway

and

Switzerland

) as well as with

Canada

and Japan. The Ambassador explained that they needed to realize the importance of the NSG exception to

India

. The Ambassador had pointed out to them that any country that blocks the NSG waiver should understand that its relationship with India would not be able to meet its maximum potential as India was likely to start a blame game, should the NSG NEW DELHI 00002367 002 OF 005 exception not go through. Ahluwalia agreed that political pressure was needed to keep the focus on the big picture. To that end, Ambassador Mulford pointed out, President Bush and Secretary Rice were making calls to the leadership of these countries; however, the non-proliferation issues were often emotive for some countries. Some of the NSG representatives in Vienna had never been to

India

and had an outdated view of the country and the world today. ¶7. (C) Mulford pointed to the substantial reductions in carbon-based emissions that would result from India,s access to nuclear energy made possible by the civil nuclear initiative. The Ambassador referenced an estimate that the amount of coal substituted with nuclear energy in India over the next twenty years was equivalent to half the amount of emissions from the state of California and more than all of the EU25 emission cuts combined (Note: according to a study by David Victor published by the Council on Foreign Relations, July 18, 2006. End note). Ahluwalia responded that India,s lead nuclear scientist, Department of Atomic Energy Chairman Dr. Anil Kakodkar, had projected that by 2050 India's access to uranium through the civil nuclear cooperation initiative would treble the amount of uranium India could process and use toward nuclear energy, going from the equivalent of 200,000 MW of power to 600,000 MW of power. But, Ahluwalia questioned, do the nonproliferation people care? The Ambassador responded that they apparently did not, since they went so far as to request that the statements in the NSG waiver text referring to the energy benefits of the deal be removed. ¶8. (C) Ahluwalia opined that keeping the language on energy benefits in the text was useful, if not to the NSG members, then to a larger audience that would consider the text. The Ambassador concurred, noting that it was important to get the text through the NSG quickly so that the bilateral deal could move not just to Congress but also to President Bush for needed presidential determinations. These determinations were one-time requirements that did not need to be repeated in a new administration. UPCOMING PRESIDENT-PRIME MINISTER MEETING ----------------------------------------- ¶9. (C) Ambassador Mulford moved to the topic of the scheduled September 25 meeting between President Bush and Prime Minister Singh in Washington. He asked Ahluwalia what issues he thought the two leaders should discuss, noting that the President was interested to know the latest on the government's reform impulse that it indicated after winning the confidence vote in Parliament in July. Ahluwalia started with a longer-term observation: that the government's decision to part ways with the Left was decided on the issue of the Indo-US civil nuclear deal, but that the parting of ways was done with the sense of it being a longer, durable split. In the short-term, Ahluwalia continued, there is still the question of whether any legislative reforms can be done before elections. He thought the most that could be done would be to introduce the insurance amendment legislation that raises the cap on foreign direct investment (FDI) from 26% to 49% and to pass the pending banking amendment act that removes the limit on voting rights of shareholders. Ahluwalia opined that introducing the insurance legislation would be the government's signal of its commitment to reform. He thought the banking amendment should go through, but it mostly depends on whether the BJP signals its support, because otherwise, the government is unlikely to be able to amass enough of its new supporters to vote for the bill. ¶10. (C) The Deputy Chairman also pointed to non-legislative reforms as being very possible. He suggested that Commerce Minister Kamal Nath could do more on investment (Note: The Commerce Ministry has the lead on the government's FDI policy that designates most FDI caps in the country not controlled by existing legislation. End note.) Ahluwalia also looked to the Banking Roadmap which is supposed to be revisited by the government and the central bank, the RBI, in 2009. He thought a new roadmap that opened

India

's banking sector to more foreign participation would not be issued until after national elections next year. He noted that the currently scheduled October-November parliamentary session was not very NEW DELHI 00002367 003 OF 005 long, and that after that, there was not likely to be a substantive session until after elections. He opined that since the deadline for a new Parliament to be in session was May 2009, that elections would have to be held by March. However, he noted, the election schedule would have to work around key school exams during that part of the year. ¶11. (C) Returning to the scope of possible reforms, Ahluwalia reiterated that the Finance Minister wants to get the banking bill through and that on non-legislative side, improving the investment environment through "debugging" the "creaking machinery" of the bureaucracy would be an important reform. The Ambassador supported the idea, noting that several American companies , most recently Oshkosh and Sikorsky, had been disqualified from bids just shortly before the bids were to be opened, raising questions of transparency. Ahluwalia admitted that he had not heard of these companies' situation. Ambassador Mulford suggested the issue could be an agenda item for the October 14 CEO Forum. Addressing the issue of questionable disqualifications would help improve the business investment image of

India

. Ahluwalia agreed, stressing that transparency was very important. However, he countered, he has seen instances where foreign companies were properly disqualified on a technicality that they knew of, yet failed to communicate circumstances properly. Even so, the Ambassador said, it would be a good idea not to have disqualifications occur just 1-2 days before the opening of bids. EDUCATION FOCUS AT CEO FORUM ---------------------------- ¶12. (SBU) The Ambassador next suggested that education collaboration might be a good agenda focus at the CEO Forum, to which Ahluwalia agreed emphatically. Ambassador Mulford asked about the possibility of commercial and military offsets being used for investments in

India

's education sector. Ahluwalia expressed the view that commercial offsets -- mostly generated from aviation purchases -- were a more likely source of revenue for higher education investments, because the Ministry of Defense is likely to use defense procurement offsets with its captive, protected state interests. ¶13. (SBU) Ahluwalia indicated that the Indian side is "keen" to step up its educational dialogue with the

United States

and may wish to have it included in the joint statement between the President and the Prime Minister at their meeting in late September. He went on to suggest that, at the October 14 CEO Forum, the CEOs could "sanctify" a plan to move forward on education collaboration. He explained that he has been reaching out to Indian CEOs and to prominent Indians in the

, asking for suggestions for cooperation between Indian and American universities. He was trying to get the Secretary of Higher Education to the CEO Forum to help get acceptance and commitment to moving forward on some kind of collaboration. Under Indian law, Ahluwalia asserted, all kinds of foreign investment in education was possible short of giving a foreign university degree. He wanted to get the CEO Forum to "sanctify" support for enhanced cooperation and to establish a formal framework. Ahluwalia also noted that, in addition to support for the idea, he wanted the private sector to help pick up the costs of exchanging students or faculty between Indian and American universities. ¶14. (SBU) The Ambassador asked for clarification that newly established programs could be for-profit, but Ahluwalia explained that for-profit universities are not currently allowed in

India

, based on a Supreme Court decision. But, he observed, several states were taking the lead in developing new education efforts, such as the Indian School of Business in Hyderabad or Haryana Chief Minister Hooda's plan to build an education city north of Delhi.

India

's private universities and schools get around the obligation to be nonprofit institutions by establishing a trust or society that contained hidden fees or very profitable hidden lease and other costs passed from the nonprofit educational subsidiary to a holding company's real estate subsidiary. ¶15. (SBU) Ahluwalia explained that he had proposed to Bill Harrison, former CEO of JP Morgan and lead US CEO of the CEO NEW DELHI 00002367 004 OF 005 Forum, that a subgroup be created to identify areas of educational collaboration. He had proposed that Infosys co-founder Nandan Nilekani be the Indian side lead, and had asked Dan Price for suggestions on a lead from the

side. Ahluwalia claimed that some collaborations are already underway between US universities and the Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs) and of Management (IIMs), India's premier universities. In fact, Ahluwalia asserted, it would not be a problem for US universities to identify an Indian university partner, where each side would send students for a part of the home program to study in the partner university and recognize the credits of each other towards the home degree. ¶16. (SBU) Embassy Public Affairs Counselor Schwartz asked whether Ahluwalia had ideas for specific deliverables that could be announced at the CEO Forum or proposed actions for the Education Working Group. Ahluwalia opined that there might be a limited deliverable, such as announcing that Nandan Nilekani and a

counterpart as co-chairs of a group to provide a report to both governments after the Indian elections. Schwartz asked whether a previously discussed idea, the creation of a junior faculty development program, perhaps funded by commercial offsets, could be kicked off at the CEO Forum working group meeting. Ahluwalia thought that was a good idea, adding that there was no doubt that a report from the CEO Forum working group to pinpoint the use of offsets would find a lot of takers and proposed that the idea of offsets be cast as a note of suggestion, along with other suggestions, for review by Nilekani's group. (Comment: Ahluwalia's suggestion sidestepped Schwartz's proposal of obtaining GOI government approval for the use of offsets by simply incorporating it as an area of study for the newly formed group. End comment.) ¶17. (SBU) Schwartz suggested that another deliverable might be the establishment of a

- India Higher Education Council, which ECA Assistant Secretary Goli Ameri had agreed to fund during her recent trip to

India

. The Council would be housed for simplicity at the Fulbright Commission which has a bilateral Board of Directors and serve as a regular consultative body for educators, along with their supporters in government and industry. Ahluwalia thought that made "a lot of sense," and suggested that in advance of the CEO Forum meeting, it would be good to discuss the idea with MEA Joint Secretary Gaitri Kumar and CII leader Tarun Das. DE-CONSTRUCTING DOHA -------------------- ¶18. (C) Ambassador Mulford lastly noted to Ahluwalia that President Bush might wish to discuss with Prime Minister Singh the recent failed mini-Ministerial in Geneva on the Doha Round. Mulford asked Ahluwalia if he thought it worth raising, to which Ahluwalia replied that anything that the President felt should be raised would be fine and in fact the two had often exchanged views on Doha before. Further, Ahluwulia felt that if the

judged there was the possibility of movement, then a discussion at the Bush-Singh level would be especially useful. Ahluwalia noted that he had not yet received a full briefing from the Indian delegation, but that Joint Secretary Gopal Krisha was scheduled to come over during the week to discuss with him. However, Ahluwalia said that he had heard from the US National Security Council's Dan Price on the August meeting. Ahluwalia understood that the breaking point had been over the special safeguard mechanism (SSM). The Indian view, Ahluwalia believed, was that the 40% increase in imports as the threshold trigger for raising tariff rates was too high. As an economist, Ahluwalia opined, he didn't understand why the percentage of imports had been used. More relevant, he asserted, was the size of imports to the economy. The larger the importance of imports to the economy, the more important a small increase in imports was. ¶19. (C) Ahluwalia further offered that his limited understanding from the Indian side was that U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Susan Schwab had hardened the

position on SSM and would not consider a compromise proposal that would have phased in an increase in the import increase trigger. The Ambassador quickly countered that the US perceived that India had hardened its stance on SSM after Commerce Minister Nath had returned to Geneva from the July NEW DELHI 00002367 005 OF 005 21 Confidence Vote in the Indian Parliament, and that the change was unexpected. Ahluwalia replied indirectly, noting that

India

's view of the SSM was that since the main proposal for the Doha bound rates was so similar to the rates from the Uruguay Round that the SSM only applied to

Uruguay

products with no margins. The key question was what should be the trigger for raising tariffs under the SSM? Economic Counselor Davison explained that SSM was very important to US agricultural interests. Many of them felt that without the SSM, the

concessions on agriculture were too much. They felt the overall package would not have resulted in increased and predictable access to Indian markets. ¶20. (C) As the meeting drew to a close, Ahluwalia reiterated that he agreed with the Ambassador that the President and Prime Minister should discuss Doha at their meeting. Ahluwalia thought there was maybe a communication issue that could be addressed. The Indian government, he assured the Ambassador, was not taking the view that there was nothing there at Doha for

India

. If there are small points where re-thinking and clarification could be made, and USTR Schwab and Minister Nath were to meet again before the President-PM meeting, then it would be useful to know what the

needs are. If it is just this "SSM thing" of choosing between either no SSM until 40% or creating a lower, graduating trigger, Ahluwalia concluded, then it did not seem to be a major difference. MULFORD MULFORD

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Seema Sapra <seema.sapra@googlemail.com>
Date: Wed, Aug 28, 2013 at 5:26 PM
Subject: Complaint against Mr Montek Singh Ahluwalia for violating Section 5 of the Official Secrets Act - by Seema Sapra, General Electric whistleblower - Writ Petition (Civil) 1280/ 2012 – in the matter of Seema Sapra v. General Electric Company and Others in the Delhi High Court
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"NDwebmail@state.gov" <NDwebmail@state.gov>, "Denise_L._Cote@nysd.uscourts.gov" <Denise_L._Cote@nysd.uscourts.gov>, "ruby_krajick@nysd.uscourts.gov" <ruby_krajick@nysd.uscourts.gov>, "Leonard_B._Sand@nysd.uscourts.gov" <Leonard_B._Sand@nysd.uscourts.gov>, "gloria_rojas@nysd.uscourts.gov" <gloria_rojas@nysd.uscourts.gov>, "william_donald@nysd.uscourts.gov" <william_donald@nysd.uscourts.gov>, "edward_friedland@nysd.uscourts.gov" <edward_friedland@nysd.uscourts.gov>, "richard_wilson@nysd.uscourts.gov" <richard_wilson@nysd.uscourts.gov>, "robert_rogers@nysd.uscourts.gov" <robert_rogers@nysd.uscourts.gov>, "kdonovan-maher@bermandevalerio.com" <kdonovan-maher@bermandevalerio.com>, "rcohen@lowey.com" <rcohen@lowey.com>, "ffetf@usdoj.gov" <ffetf@usdoj.gov>, "Harold_Baer@nysd.uscourts.gov" <Harold_Baer@nysd.uscourts.gov>, "Jed_S._Rakoff@nysd.uscourts.gov" <Jed_S._Rakoff@nysd.uscourts.gov>, "Cathy_Seibel@nysd.uscourts.gov" <Cathy_Seibel@nysd.uscourts.gov>, "Victor_Marrero@nysd.uscourts.gov" <Victor_Marrero@nysd.uscourts.gov>, "fja@federaljudgesassoc.org" <fja@federaljudgesassoc.org>, "supremecourt@nic.in" <supremecourt@nic.in>, "Loretta_A._Preska@nysd.uscourts.gov" <Loretta_A._Preska@nysd.uscourts.gov>, "Ronald J. Keating" <RKeating@bermandevalerio.com>, jtabacco@bermandevalerio.com, bhart@lowey.com, rharwood@hfesq.com, Joseph Guglielmo <jguglielmo@scott-scott.com>, drscott@scott-scott.com, "ombudsperson@corporate.ge.com" <ombudsperson@corporate.ge.com>, Directors@corporate.ge.com, Siemens Ombudsman COM <mail@siemens-ombudsman.com>, Sunder.Venkat@aero.bombardier.com, compliance.office@bombardier.com, nilesh.pattanayak@aero.bombardier.com, pierre.beaudoin@bombardier.com, djohnson@mccarthy.ca, douglas.oberhelman@caterpilllar.com, william.ainsworth@caterpillar.com, CATshareservices@cat.com, BusinessPractices@cat.com, patrick.kron@alstom.com, keith.carr@alstom.com, Jean-David.barnea@usdoj.gov, reed.brodsky@usdoj.gov, andrew.michaelson@usdoj.gov, ellen.davis@usdoj.gov, eric.glover@usdoj.gov, paul.murphy@usdoj.gov, sandra.glover@usdoj.gov, robert.spector@usdoj.gov, christopher.connolly@usdoj.gov, joseph.cordaro@usdoj.gov, david.jones6@usdoj.gov, daniel.filor@usdoj.gov, amy.barcelo@usdoj.gov, christopher.harwood@usdoj.gov, michael.byars@usdoj.gov, benjamin.torrance@usdoj.gov, sarah.normand@usdoj.gov, elizabeth.shapiro@usdoj.gov, alicia.simmons@usdoj.gov, joyce.vance@usdoj.gov, kenyen.brown@usdoj.gov, karen.loeffler@usdoj.gov, andre.birotte@usdoj.gov, melinda.haag@usdoj.gov, laura.duffy@usdoj.gov, john.walsh@usdoj.gov, david.weiss@usdoj.gov, ronald.machen@usdoj.gov, robert.o'neill@usdoj.gov, pamela.marsh@usdoj.gov, wifredo.ferrer@usdoj.gov, michael.moore@usdoj.gov, sally yates <sally.yates@usdoj.gov>, edward.tarver@usdoj.gov, alicia.limtiaco@usdoj.gov, florence.nakakuni@usdoj.gov, wendy.olson@usdoj.gov, james.lewis@usdoj.gov, patrick.fitzgerald@usdoj.gov, stephen.wigginton@usdoj.gov, david.capp@usdoj.gov, joseph.hogsett@usdoj.gov, stephanie.rose@usdoj.gov, nick.klinefeldt@usdoj.gov, kerry.harvey@usdoj.gov, david.hale@usdoj.gov, stephanie.finley@usdoj.gov, rod.rosenstein@usdoj.gov, carmen.ortiz@usdoj.gov, barbara.mcquade@usdoj.gov, b.todd.jones@usdoj.gov, william.martin@usdoj.gov, richard.callahan@usdoj.gov, beth.phillips@usdoj.gov, michael.cotter@usdoj.gov, deborah.gilg@usdoj.gov, daniel.bogden@usdoj.gov, john.kacavas@usdoj.gov, paul.fishman@usdoj.gov, kenneth.gonzales@usdoj.gov, loretta.lynch@usdoj.gov, richard.hartunian@usdoj.gov, william.hochul@usdoj.gov, john.stone@usdoj.gov, anne.tompkins@usdoj.gov, tim.purdon@usdoj.gov, steve.dettelbach@usdoj.gov, carter.stewart@usdoj.gov, sandy.coats@usdoj.gov, zane.memeger@usdoj.gov, peter.smith@usdoj.gov, david.hickton@usdoj.gov, peter.neronha@usdoj.gov, bill.nettles@usdoj.gov, william.killian@usdoj.gov, jerry.martin@usdoj.gov, edward.stanton@usdoj.gov, jose.moreno@usdoj.gov, carlie.christensen@usdoj.gov, tristram.coffin@usdoj.gov, ronald.sharpe@usdoj.gov, neil.macbride@usdoj.gov, timothy.heaphy@usdoj.gov, bill.ihlenfeld@usdoj.gov, booth.goodwin@usdoj.gov, james.santelle@usdoj.gov, john.vaudreuil@usdoj.gov, christopher.crofts@usdoj.gov, bprao@bhel.in, opb@bhel.in, akhatua@bhel.in, csverma@bhel.in, vpandhi@bhel.in, saraya@bhel.in, ajay.sinha@emdiesels.com, "singhadvocate@hotmail.com" <singhadvocate@hotmail.com>, najmiwaziri@hotmail.com, Rajeeve Mehra <mehralaw@gmail.com>, mehralaw@yahoo.co.in, lajita.rajesh@alstom.com, francois.carpentier@alstom.com, armin.bruck@siemens.com, sunil.mathur@siemens.com, benoit.martel@bombardier.com, luis.ramos@bombardier.com, harsh.dhingra@bombardier.com, glen.lehman@caterpillar.com, john.newman@caterpillar.com, peter.solmssen@siemens.com, roland.busch@siemens.com, michael.suess@siemens.com, klaus.helmrich@siemens.com, daniel.desjardins@bombardier.com, james.buda@caterpillar.com, adam.smith@emdiesels.com, glen.lehman@progressrail.com, duane.cantrell@progressrail.com, craig.johnson@caterpillar.com, alert.procedure@alstom.com, harjeetsinghsachdeva@gmail.com, "Zia Mody (zia.mody@azbpartners.com)" <zia.mody@azbpartners.com>, "Warin, F. Joseph" <fwarin@gibsondunn.com>, "Chesley, John" <JChesley@gibsondunn.com>, pk65sharma@yahoo.co.in, confidential@sfo.gsi.gov.uk, public.enquiries@sfo.gsi.gov.uk, "ohhdl@dalailama.com" <ohhdl@dalailama.com>, dhir@dhirassociates.com, amit.sibal@amitsibal.com, stephen.vogt@ic.fbi.gov, luis.quesada@ic.fbi.gov, steven.kessler@ic.fbi.gov, henry.gittleman@ic.fbi.gov, renn.cannon@ic.fbi.gov, stephen.gaudin@ic.fbi.gov, eric.peterson@ic.fbi.gov, jeff.bedford@ic.fbi.gov, david.brooks@ic.fbi.gov, robert.clifford@ic.fbi.gov, mary.warren@ic.fbi.gov, bill.nicholson@ic.fbi.gov, frank.teixeira@ic.fbi.gov, richard.cavalieros@ic.fbi.gov, timothy.langan@ic.fbi.gov, sharon.kuo@ic.fbi.gov, kingman.wong@ic.fbi.gov, daniel.bodony@ic.fbi.gov, christopher.mcmurray@ic.fbi.gov, ralph.hope@ic.fbi.gov, eric.metz@ic.fbi.gov, daniel.baldwin@ic.fbi.gov, alejandro.barbeito@ic.fbi.gov, cary.gleicher@ic.fbi.gov, paul.haertel@ic.fbi.gov, greg.cox@ic.fbi.gov, lazaro.andino@ic.fbi.gov, gabriel.ramirez@ic.fbi.gov, tom.sobocinski@ic.fbi.gov, benjamin.walker@ic.fbi.gov, kirk.striebich@ic.fbi.gov, "Snyder, David" <david.snyder@ic.fbi.gov>, gregory.cox@ic.fbi.gov, katherine.andrews@ic.fbi.gov, carolyn.willson@ic.fbi.gov, mark.nowak@ic.fbi.gov, stuart.wirtz@ic.fbi.gov, lesley.buckler@ic.fbi.gov, daniel.dudzinski@ic.fbi.gov, william.peterson@ic.fbi.gov, connally.brown@ic.fbi.gov, leo.navarette@ic.fbi.gov, lawrence.futa@ic.fbi.gov, gregory.shaffer@ic.fbi.gov, daniel.clegg@ic.fbi.gov, adishaggarwala@yahoo.com, adishaggarwala@hotmail.com, vsondhi@luthra.com, muraritiwari.adv@gmail.com, adv.priyankatyagi@gmail.com, sarlakaushik@yahoo.com, goswamiandassociates@yahoo.co.in, vedbaldev@rediffmail.com, rakeshtikuadvocate@yahoo.com, kkmanan@rediffmail.com, ars.chauhan.co@gmail.com, Usama Siddiqui <musiddiqui@gmail.com>, Rajiv Khosla <advrajivkhosla@gmail.com>, rakeshkochar@hotmail.com, khatri.surya@hotmail.com, puneet mittal <puneetmittal9@gmail.com>, "advamit.sharma@gmail.com" <advamit.sharma@gmail.com>, abhay kumar verma <akvadvocates@gmail.com>, Attorneynitin@yahoo.com, attorney.rmishra@gmail.com, jaibirnagar@gmail.com, bharati@chintan-india.org, info@chintan-india.org, indu@igsss.net, Subramanian Swamy <swamy39@gmail.com>
Cc: Seema Sapra <seema.sapra@gmail.com>, Seema Sapra <seemasapra@hotmail.com>, secy.president@rb.nic.in, mathew.thomas@rb.nic.in

To the President of India, the Prime Minister of India, the Home Minister of India, and the Chief Justice of India,

Please see the attached affidavit filed by me in the Delhi High Court in W.P. (Civil) 1280/ 2012.

Along with this affidavit as Annexure P-2, I have filed true copies of two cables sent by the US Embassy in India that describe private non-official discussions and meetings between Montek Singh Ahluwalia and the US Ambassador and other US Embassy and US government officials.

This cables (which constitute only the tip of the iceberg of evidence against Mr Montek Singh Ahluwalia) establish that Montek Singh Ahluwalia is a lobbyist for US interests in India and that he has by wrongfully sharing information with the US Embassy and US Government, violated Section 5 of the Official Secrets Act which is attached.

Not only does Montek Singh Ahluwalia disclose information to US officials in violation of Section 5 of the Official Secrets Act, he also presents himself as an interlocuter and lobbyist for pushing through US interests within the Indian governmental process, and he even advises US officials/ government on how best to achieve US goals
within the Indian governmental process. Montek Singh Ahluwalia is therefore misusing his official position within the Government of India to unofficially help and assist the United States government in achieving/ securing US strategic and commercial interests in Indian governmental decision making. Mr Montek Singh Ahluwalia is in these cables described as advising the US government on how to gain an upper hand over Indian bureaucrats and ministers and Indian governmental processes, and in one instance advising on how US educational businesses can break Indian law.

These cables establish that Montek Singh Ahluwalia advises the United States Government against Indian strategic interests in diplomacy and state-to-state relations. This would makes Montek Singh Ahluwalia a
traitor guilty of treason.

This basically means that Montek Singh Ahluwalia is a spy acting for the United States government. That Montek Singh Ahluwalia is a CIA agent/ asset has been publicly articulated by several eminent Indians.

Mr Montek Singh Ahluwalia must be investigated and prosecuted for violation of Section 5 of the Official Secrets Act and the two cables in the attached Annexure P-2 provide sufficient evidence of this, though additional evidence against Mr Montek Singh Ahluwalia can be easily gathered.

Seema Sapra

Annexure P-2

Cable reference id: #07NEWDELHI4272

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Reference id	aka Wikileaks id #122608 ?
Subject	Ambassador Discusses Ceo Forum Issues With Planning Commission Deputy Chairman Ahluwalia
Origin	Embassy New Delhi (India)
Cable time	Tue, 18 Sep 2007 12:16 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/09/07NEWDELHI4272.html
History	Time unknown: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks Wed, 6 Apr 2011 19:54: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs Fri, 26 Aug 2011 02:34: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies

Hide header UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 004272 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEC DIRECTOR HUBBARD USDOC FOR ITA/MAC/OSA/LDROKER/ASTERN/KRUDD DEPT OF ENERGY FOR A/S KHARBERT, TCUTLER, CZAMUDA, RLUHAR DEPT PASS TO USTR DHARTWICK/CLILIENFELD/AADLER DEPT PASS TO TREASURY FOR OFFICE OF SOUTH ASIA ABAUKOL TREASURY PASS TO FRB SAN FRANCISCO/TERESA CURRAN STATE FOR P, SCA/INS AND EB/TRA JEFFREY HORWITZ AND TOM ENGLE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EFIN [Financial and Monetary Affairs], EINV [Foreign Investments], EPET [Petroleum and Natural Gas], ETRD [Foreign Trade], SENV [Environmental Affairs], PREL [External Political Relations], PARM [Arms Controls and Disarmament], TSPL [Science and Technology Policy], KNNP [Nuclear Non-Proliferation], TRGY [Energy Technology], IN [India; Andaman Islands; Lakshadweep Islands; Nicobar Islands] SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES CEO FORUM ISSUES WITH PLANNING COMMISSION DEPUTY CHAIRMAN AHLUWALIA NEW DELHI 00004272 001.2 OF 002 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: The Ambassador met September 14 with Planning Commission Deputy Chairman Montek Ahluwalia to discuss the upcoming CEO Forum, mid-October visit to India by Energy Deputy Secretary Sell for the APP and Energy Dialogue, and the end of October visit by Treasury Secretary Paulson and NEC Director Hubbard. Ambassador also urged GOI resolution of the outstanding legacy issues of McDermott and Dow Chemical. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) The Ambassador noted that the CEO Forum was unique in that it was one of the few private sector forums that attracted great interest and attendance from senior government officials. It was therefore important that the September 24 discussion focus on critical issues including infrastructure financing and the impact of inadequate IPR protection on foreign investment in India that has lead to the recent decision by the Swiss pharmaceutical company, Novartis, to pull out of India after its latest patent application was denied. Ahluwalia agreed and said that he hoped the U.S.-India civil nuclear agreement would not be on the agenda since the ball was in India's court to move forward in a process well known to everyone. Ambassador noted that, at some point, prospects for U.S. private sector investment in India's civil nuclear industry would be an appropriate discussion topic at the CEO Forum, but not until the Agreement had been operationalized. Ahluwalia said that he would discuss with Foreign Secretary Menon keeping the civil nuclear agreement off the agenda, and Ambassador said that he would take it up with Under Secretary Burns. ¶3. (SBU) The Ambassador said that it might be useful to repeat the formula used in last year's successful CEO Forum by using the lunch to follow up on important economic issues previously raised in the morning meeting, and avoid topics like civil nuclear and the Doha Round that will accomplish little in the short time available. Ahluwalia agreed and said that CII and the Ministry of External Affairs had been discussing with State and the NSC the idea of moving from one large rectangular table to several round tables that would group CEOs and government officials according to their interest in particular issues/topics. Ahluwalia added that the GOI intended to present a 14 point non-paper on progress made and remaining/new issues that could be useful for discussion and follow up after the meeting. Ahluwalia said that Hubbard in a recent phone conversation said that the U.S. also intended to raise agricultural/phyto-sanitary concerns. ¶4. (SBU) The Ambassador said that the October 29-30 visit of Treasury Secretary Paulson to India presented a great opportunity to focus on creating a climate of finance for infrastructure. He added that Paulson and his team will bring great knowledge and experience on financial market supervision, regulatory issues, securitization, debt, and other key areas. Ahluwalia said that he will be joining the Ambassador in the October 29 Infrastructure Conference in Mumbai that Paulson and Indian Finance Minister Chidambaram will open. Ahluwalia noted that it would be helpful if there was some movement on U.S. approval of ICICI's and Bank of India's long-pending U.S. bank branch applications. He added that there was a lot of irritation in MOF over this issue, especially since Secretary Paulson had told Chidambaram a year ago that there would be action. Despite the lack of progress, Ahluwalia noted that MOF had recently approved three new branches in India for Citibank. Ambassador responded that the delay was not due to protectionism on the U.S. part, but because of regulatory issues that required India's establishment of an anti-money laundering/terrorist financing regime (AML/CTF) that meets international standards. The Ambassador noted that India had joined the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) as an observer with the goal of full membership, which was a welcome step. Ahluwalia asked for a one page note on outstanding issues related to AML/CTF that he could discuss with Chidambaram before the CEO Forum. ¶5. (SBU) The Ambassador said that Deputy Secretary of Energy Clay Sells will visit India in mid-October for the Asia Partnership Program (APP) summit and the U.S.-India Energy Dialogue. He added that Secretary Rice is also considering coming out for the APP. ¶6. (SBU) Aluwalia asked what the key deadlines are for NEW DELHI 00004272 002.2 OF 002 operationalizing the Civil Nuclear Agreement. The Ambassador said that there can be no Congressional vote until India has reached agreement first with the IAEA, then the NSG. Given the 90 day Congressional review requirement before a vote is possible, India would have to conclude the first two steps by December in order to get a vote in Congress by the end of February. After that, getting it on the Congressional calendar next year would be much more difficult. Ambassador added that the U.S. has been very quiet publicly on the Agreement since July in order to avoid "stirring things up" for the GOI as it deals with political debate here. Ahluwalia said that the issue in India is who will blink first, Congress or the Left. For the Left, it is clear the issue is not the 123 Agreement, but the deepening U.S.-India relationship which they vehemently oppose. Ahluwalia said that there are two possibilities if Congress calls the Left's bluff: it could continue as a minority government until calling for elections, or the Left could join with the BJP in bringing down the government, leading to elections. In either case, Ahluwalia said the Government is presently in a good political position to go into elections, but it would be better to go to the polls on issues other than the 123 Agreement. ¶7. (SBU) Returning to the CEO Forum, the Ambassador said that McDermott International CEO Nesbitt will be attending and there are reports that the GOI may announce at the Forum that it is taking steps to finally resolve this long outstanding legacy issue. Ambassador cautioned that any action that fell short of expeditiously settling in full the Supreme Court Judgment in favor of McDermott, such as a partial payment through the bankruptcy proceedings, will go down badly and create major ill feelings in the U.S. business community. The Ambassador also cited the GOI's continued third party claims against Dow Chemical in the ongoing Bhopal land reclamation lawsuit as a further impediment by Dow and others to invest in India, and he asked that the GOI drop its claims against Dow. Ahluwalia took the Ambassador's points on McDermott, noting the importance of finally putting the issue to rest. On Dow, he said that the GOI does not understand Dow's concern about future civil or criminal liability since the GOI third-party claims do not suggest a GOI presumption that Dow is responsible for the cleanup. The GOI's problem is that the NGOs are very active and vocal in this case, and it is very difficult for the Government to now drop its claims against Dow. The GOI was hoping for a quick resolution of the case which would have settled the issue, but Dow prevented this by asking for a stay in the proceedings. Ahluwalia noted that the issue of whether a company like Dow can be held liable for the actions of another company solely on the basis of acquiring that company after the culpable activity occurred is an important and novel legal issue in India that needs to be resolved. Ahluwalia recommended that the Ambassador discuss the issue with Finance Minister Chidambaram - a noted jurist. ¶8. (SBU) Ambassador again stressed the importance of the financial sector in upcoming U.S.-India discussions, noting that a central economic issue for India is the long-term status of its financial markets. He added that India's financial markets today have the makings for a regional financial center, given India's huge hinterland and large and increasing savings rates that mirror the conditions in the U.S. banking sector a generation ago. The Ambassador said that virtually all large U.S. banks were once domestic-centered, before they went global. Ahluwalia agreed, noting that the GOI (with MOF and Prime Minister approval) had just commissioned a High Level Committee on Financial Sector Reforms, composed mostly of private sector individuals, to make recommendations by next March on next steps in financial sector reform. He added that, until India ends the dominance of the State in the banking sector, there will never be a level playing field for private or foreign banks that is necessary if India is to establish itself as a regional financial center. MULFORD

Cable reference id: #08NEWDELHI2367

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Reference id	aka Wikileaks id #168360 ?
Subject	Ambassador Meets With Montek Singh Ahluwalia
Origin	Embassy New Delhi (India)
Cable time	Thu, 4 Sep 2008 00:59 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/09/08NEWDELHI2367.html
History	Time unknown: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies

Hide header C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 NEW DELHI 002367 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/03/2028 TAGS: EAGR [Agriculture and Forestry], ECON [Economic Conditions], EDU [European Democratic Union], EINV [Foreign Investments], ENRG [Energy and Power], ETRD [Foreign Trade], ETTC [Trade and Technology Controls], IN [India; Andaman Islands; Lakshadweep Islands; Nicobar Islands], KNNP [Nuclear Non-Proliferation], PARM [Arms Controls and Disarmament], PREL [External Political Relations], TRGY [Energy Technology], TSPL [Science and Technology Policy] SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH MONTEK SINGH AHLUWALIA 1. (C) Summary. Ambassador met with Planning Commission Deputy Chairman Montek Singh Ahluwalia on September 2 to discuss upcoming high level bilateral meetings, including the President-Prime Minister meeting on September 25 and the CEO Forum scheduled for October 14. In addition, the Ambassador provided an update to Ahluwalia on the August 22-23 Nuclear Suppliers Group meeting in Vienna and his outlook for the second meeting scheduled for September 4-5. End summary. AMBASSADOR REVIEWS NSG DEVELOPMENTS ----------------------------------- ¶2. (C) First, Ambassador Mulford provided Ahluwalia an update on events at the August 21-22 Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Plenary in Vienna. The Ambassador expressed disappointment and shock at the positions that many of the NSG members took. USG officials had engaged with the NSG members in the lead-up to the Plenary and the members had signaled that they were "supportive" but had "concerns." The Ambassador then noted that NSG members submitted over 60 amendments in the Vienna meeting to the draft NSG exception that the U.S. had submitted. Ambassador Mulford observed that the surprising number of substantial amendments nearly amounted to a question of good faith, with key NSG members' non-proliferation advocates allowed the upper hand. ¶3. (C) The Ambassador described to Ahluwalia how the meeting in Vienna had 400 people ) minus the Indian delegation that had to remain outside ) with all the chairs facing forward toward the Chairman's desk, in a configuration that discouraged debate and enabled NSG members to offer tough amendments semi-anonymously. Ambassador Mulford also explained to Ahluwalia that in the briefing with the Indian delegation ) primarily Foreign Secretary Meno and Special Envoy Shyan Saran ) during a scheduled break in the NSG Plenary, the Indian side solicited questions from the NSG members. None were offered. US representative John Rood also encouraged the participants to utilize the opportunity to ask questions of the Indian delegation, but no one did. Looking Forward --------------- ¶4. (C) The Ambassador then considered the next steps. He noted that India and the US have negotiated a "clean" text, but that he anticipates it will be an extremely hard sell in the next NSG meeting in Vienna on September 4-5. Ambassador Mulford assured Ahluwalia that the US goal was to try to keep the text "sacrosanct," with NSG member concerns limited to comments in the Chairman's Summary. The Ambassador identified several text changes that he thought would be unacceptable: the "multilateralization" of the Hyde Act, and any language that demanded automatic sanctions in response to further nuclear testing. Whether it would be possible to avoid such language, Mulford didn't know. ¶5. (C) Secretary Rice had asked the Ambassador to stay in Delhi during the September 4-5 Vienna Plenary to engage the GoI if needed. Mulford noted that National Security Advisor Narayanan had spoken with him that day and was not happy to learn that the Ambassador would not be in Vienna to help move the deal through. Mulford observed that one of the problems with the NSG meetings was the representational mode )- that NSG members had designated their non-proliferation advocates as participants at the Plenary rather than senior political representatives who could see the big picture at stake. The big issue for the NSG was whether the international nonproliferation system would be stronger with India on the inside. The US delegation on September 4-5 would be led by State Department Under Secretary for Political Affairs Bill Burns, which added weight to the meeting. ¶6. (C) Ambassador Mulford apprised Ahluwalia of his discussions with the "Group of Six" like-minded country members of the NSG ) Austria, Ireland, New Zealand, Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland ) as well as with Canada and Japan. The Ambassador explained that they needed to realize the importance of the NSG exception to India. The Ambassador had pointed out to them that any country that blocks the NSG waiver should understand that its relationship with India would not be able to meet its maximum potential as India was likely to start a blame game, should the NSG NEW DELHI 00002367 002 OF 005 exception not go through. Ahluwalia agreed that political pressure was needed to keep the focus on the big picture. To that end, Ambassador Mulford pointed out, President Bush and Secretary Rice were making calls to the leadership of these countries; however, the non-proliferation issues were often emotive for some countries. Some of the NSG representatives in Vienna had never been to India and had an outdated view of the country and the world today. ¶7. (C) Mulford pointed to the substantial reductions in carbon-based emissions that would result from India,s access to nuclear energy made possible by the civil nuclear initiative. The Ambassador referenced an estimate that the amount of coal substituted with nuclear energy in India over the next twenty years was equivalent to half the amount of emissions from the state of California and more than all of the EU25 emission cuts combined (Note: according to a study by David Victor published by the Council on Foreign Relations, July 18, 2006. End note). Ahluwalia responded that India,s lead nuclear scientist, Department of Atomic Energy Chairman Dr. Anil Kakodkar, had projected that by 2050 India's access to uranium through the civil nuclear cooperation initiative would treble the amount of uranium India could process and use toward nuclear energy, going from the equivalent of 200,000 MW of power to 600,000 MW of power. But, Ahluwalia questioned, do the nonproliferation people care? The Ambassador responded that they apparently did not, since they went so far as to request that the statements in the NSG waiver text referring to the energy benefits of the deal be removed. ¶8. (C) Ahluwalia opined that keeping the language on energy benefits in the text was useful, if not to the NSG members, then to a larger audience that would consider the text. The Ambassador concurred, noting that it was important to get the text through the NSG quickly so that the bilateral deal could move not just to Congress but also to President Bush for needed presidential determinations. These determinations were one-time requirements that did not need to be repeated in a new administration. UPCOMING PRESIDENT-PRIME MINISTER MEETING ----------------------------------------- ¶9. (C) Ambassador Mulford moved to the topic of the scheduled September 25 meeting between President Bush and Prime Minister Singh in Washington. He asked Ahluwalia what issues he thought the two leaders should discuss, noting that the President was interested to know the latest on the government's reform impulse that it indicated after winning the confidence vote in Parliament in July. Ahluwalia started with a longer-term observation: that the government's decision to part ways with the Left was decided on the issue of the Indo-US civil nuclear deal, but that the parting of ways was done with the sense of it being a longer, durable split. In the short-term, Ahluwalia continued, there is still the question of whether any legislative reforms can be done before elections. He thought the most that could be done would be to introduce the insurance amendment legislation that raises the cap on foreign direct investment (FDI) from 26% to 49% and to pass the pending banking amendment act that removes the limit on voting rights of shareholders. Ahluwalia opined that introducing the insurance legislation would be the government's signal of its commitment to reform. He thought the banking amendment should go through, but it mostly depends on whether the BJP signals its support, because otherwise, the government is unlikely to be able to amass enough of its new supporters to vote for the bill. ¶10. (C) The Deputy Chairman also pointed to non-legislative reforms as being very possible. He suggested that Commerce Minister Kamal Nath could do more on investment (Note: The Commerce Ministry has the lead on the government's FDI policy that designates most FDI caps in the country not controlled by existing legislation. End note.) Ahluwalia also looked to the Banking Roadmap which is supposed to be revisited by the government and the central bank, the RBI, in 2009. He thought a new roadmap that opened India's banking sector to more foreign participation would not be issued until after national elections next year. He noted that the currently scheduled October-November parliamentary session was not very NEW DELHI 00002367 003 OF 005 long, and that after that, there was not likely to be a substantive session until after elections. He opined that since the deadline for a new Parliament to be in session was May 2009, that elections would have to be held by March. However, he noted, the election schedule would have to work around key school exams during that part of the year. ¶11. (C) Returning to the scope of possible reforms, Ahluwalia reiterated that the Finance Minister wants to get the banking bill through and that on non-legislative side, improving the investment environment through "debugging" the "creaking machinery" of the bureaucracy would be an important reform. The Ambassador supported the idea, noting that several American companies , most recently Oshkosh and Sikorsky, had been disqualified from bids just shortly before the bids were to be opened, raising questions of transparency. Ahluwalia admitted that he had not heard of these companies' situation. Ambassador Mulford suggested the issue could be an agenda item for the October 14 CEO Forum. Addressing the issue of questionable disqualifications would help improve the business investment image of India. Ahluwalia agreed, stressing that transparency was very important. However, he countered, he has seen instances where foreign companies were properly disqualified on a technicality that they knew of, yet failed to communicate circumstances properly. Even so, the Ambassador said, it would be a good idea not to have disqualifications occur just 1-2 days before the opening of bids. EDUCATION FOCUS AT CEO FORUM ---------------------------- ¶12. (SBU) The Ambassador next suggested that education collaboration might be a good agenda focus at the CEO Forum, to which Ahluwalia agreed emphatically. Ambassador Mulford asked about the possibility of commercial and military offsets being used for investments in India's education sector. Ahluwalia expressed the view that commercial offsets -- mostly generated from aviation purchases -- were a more likely source of revenue for higher education investments, because the Ministry of Defense is likely to use defense procurement offsets with its captive, protected state interests. ¶13. (SBU) Ahluwalia indicated that the Indian side is "keen" to step up its educational dialogue with the United States and may wish to have it included in the joint statement between the President and the Prime Minister at their meeting in late September. He went on to suggest that, at the October 14 CEO Forum, the CEOs could "sanctify" a plan to move forward on education collaboration. He explained that he has been reaching out to Indian CEOs and to prominent Indians in the US, asking for suggestions for cooperation between Indian and American universities. He was trying to get the Secretary of Higher Education to the CEO Forum to help get acceptance and commitment to moving forward on some kind of collaboration. Under Indian law, Ahluwalia asserted, all kinds of foreign investment in education was possible short of giving a foreign university degree. He wanted to get the CEO Forum to "sanctify" support for enhanced cooperation and to establish a formal framework. Ahluwalia also noted that, in addition to support for the idea, he wanted the private sector to help pick up the costs of exchanging students or faculty between Indian and American universities. ¶14. (SBU) The Ambassador asked for clarification that newly established programs could be for-profit, but Ahluwalia explained that for-profit universities are not currently allowed in India, based on a Supreme Court decision. But, he observed, several states were taking the lead in developing new education efforts, such as the Indian School of Business in Hyderabad or Haryana Chief Minister Hooda's plan to build an education city north of Delhi. India's private universities and schools get around the obligation to be nonprofit institutions by establishing a trust or society that contained hidden fees or very profitable hidden lease and other costs passed from the nonprofit educational subsidiary to a holding company's real estate subsidiary. ¶15. (SBU) Ahluwalia explained that he had proposed to Bill Harrison, former CEO of JP Morgan and lead US CEO of the CEO NEW DELHI 00002367 004 OF 005 Forum, that a subgroup be created to identify areas of educational collaboration. He had proposed that Infosys co-founder Nandan Nilekani be the Indian side lead, and had asked Dan Price for suggestions on a lead from the US side. Ahluwalia claimed that some collaborations are already underway between US universities and the Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs) and of Management (IIMs), India's premier universities. In fact, Ahluwalia asserted, it would not be a problem for US universities to identify an Indian university partner, where each side would send students for a part of the home program to study in the partner university and recognize the credits of each other towards the home degree. ¶16. (SBU) Embassy Public Affairs Counselor Schwartz asked whether Ahluwalia had ideas for specific deliverables that could be announced at the CEO Forum or proposed actions for the Education Working Group. Ahluwalia opined that there might be a limited deliverable, such as announcing that Nandan Nilekani and a US counterpart as co-chairs of a group to provide a report to both governments after the Indian elections. Schwartz asked whether a previously discussed idea, the creation of a junior faculty development program, perhaps funded by commercial offsets, could be kicked off at the CEO Forum working group meeting. Ahluwalia thought that was a good idea, adding that there was no doubt that a report from the CEO Forum working group to pinpoint the use of offsets would find a lot of takers and proposed that the idea of offsets be cast as a note of suggestion, along with other suggestions, for review by Nilekani's group. (Comment: Ahluwalia's suggestion sidestepped Schwartz's proposal of obtaining GOI government approval for the use of offsets by simply incorporating it as an area of study for the newly formed group. End comment.) ¶17. (SBU) Schwartz suggested that another deliverable might be the establishment of a US - India Higher Education Council, which ECA Assistant Secretary Goli Ameri had agreed to fund during her recent trip to India. The Council would be housed for simplicity at the Fulbright Commission which has a bilateral Board of Directors and serve as a regular consultative body for educators, along with their supporters in government and industry. Ahluwalia thought that made "a lot of sense," and suggested that in advance of the CEO Forum meeting, it would be good to discuss the idea with MEA Joint Secretary Gaitri Kumar and CII leader Tarun Das. DE-CONSTRUCTING DOHA -------------------- ¶18. (C) Ambassador Mulford lastly noted to Ahluwalia that President Bush might wish to discuss with Prime Minister Singh the recent failed mini-Ministerial in Geneva on the Doha Round. Mulford asked Ahluwalia if he thought it worth raising, to which Ahluwalia replied that anything that the President felt should be raised would be fine and in fact the two had often exchanged views on Doha before. Further, Ahluwulia felt that if the US judged there was the possibility of movement, then a discussion at the Bush-Singh level would be especially useful. Ahluwalia noted that he had not yet received a full briefing from the Indian delegation, but that Joint Secretary Gopal Krisha was scheduled to come over during the week to discuss with him. However, Ahluwalia said that he had heard from the US National Security Council's Dan Price on the August meeting. Ahluwalia understood that the breaking point had been over the special safeguard mechanism (SSM). The Indian view, Ahluwalia believed, was that the 40% increase in imports as the threshold trigger for raising tariff rates was too high. As an economist, Ahluwalia opined, he didn't understand why the percentage of imports had been used. More relevant, he asserted, was the size of imports to the economy. The larger the importance of imports to the economy, the more important a small increase in imports was. ¶19. (C) Ahluwalia further offered that his limited understanding from the Indian side was that U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Susan Schwab had hardened the US position on SSM and would not consider a compromise proposal that would have phased in an increase in the import increase trigger. The Ambassador quickly countered that the US perceived that India had hardened its stance on SSM after Commerce Minister Nath had returned to Geneva from the July NEW DELHI 00002367 005 OF 005 21 Confidence Vote in the Indian Parliament, and that the change was unexpected. Ahluwalia replied indirectly, noting that India's view of the SSM was that since the main proposal for the Doha bound rates was so similar to the rates from the Uruguay Round that the SSM only applied to Uruguay products with no margins. The key question was what should be the trigger for raising tariffs under the SSM? Economic Counselor Davison explained that SSM was very important to US agricultural interests. Many of them felt that without the SSM, the US concessions on agriculture were too much. They felt the overall package would not have resulted in increased and predictable access to Indian markets. ¶20. (C) As the meeting drew to a close, Ahluwalia reiterated that he agreed with the Ambassador that the President and Prime Minister should discuss Doha at their meeting. Ahluwalia thought there was maybe a communication issue that could be addressed. The Indian government, he assured the Ambassador, was not taking the view that there was nothing there at Doha for India. If there are small points where re-thinking and clarification could be made, and USTR Schwab and Minister Nath were to meet again before the President-PM meeting, then it would be useful to know what the US needs are. If it is just this "SSM thing" of choosing between either no SSM until 40% or creating a lower, graduating trigger, Ahluwalia concluded, then it did not seem to be a major difference. MULFORD MULFORD

Montek Singh Ahluwalia - An American spy and economic hit-man

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Sunday 4 May 2014

Montek the US agent - Complaint against Mr Montek Singh Ahluwalia for violating Section 5 of the Official Secrets Act - by Seema Sapra, General Electric whistleblower - Writ Petition (Civil) 1280/ 2012 – in the matter of Seema Sapra v. General Electric Company and Others in the Delhi High Court