Complaint against Mr Montek Singh Ahluwalia for violation of Section 5 of the Official Secrets Act - by Seema Sapra, General Electric whistleblower - Writ Petition (Civil) 1280/ 2012 – in the matter of Seema Sapra v. General Electric Company and Others in the Delhi High Court

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Seema Sapra <seema.sapra@googlemail.com>
Date: Mon, Aug 18, 2014 at 1:35 PM
Subject: Complaint against Mr Montek Singh Ahluwalia for violation of
Section 5 of the Official Secrets Act - by Seema Sapra, General
Electric whistleblower - Writ Petition (Civil) 1280/ 2012 – in the
matter of Seema Sapra v. General Electric Company and Others in the
Delhi High Court
To: fmo@nic.in, bhushansinha@nic.in, Satya Pal Bhatia
<spbhatia777@gmail.com>, raj parshad vats <rpvats2@gmail.com>,
secy-dea@nic.in, sanjeev_sh@nic.in, jsrev@nic.in,
rajesh.khullar@nic.in, "pmosb@pmo.nic.in" <pmosb@pmo.nic.in>,
"pmosb@nic.in" <pmosb@nic.in>, "cvc@nic.in" <cvc@nic.in>,
"dcbi@cbi.gov.in" <dcbi@cbi.gov.in>, "rg.dhc@nic.in" <rg.dhc@nic.in>,
cabinet@nic.in, "hm@nic.in" <hm@nic.in>, president@bjp.org, Amit Shah
<amitshah.bjp@gmail.com>, "help@sec.gov" <help@sec.gov>,
"chairmanoffice@sec.gov" <chairmanoffice@sec.gov>,
ramji.bjp@gmail.com, Mukul Rohatgi <mukul17855@gmail.com>,
sanjayjain.chamber@gmail.com, Bhim Sain Bassi <cp.bsbassi@nic.in>,
"supremecourt@nic.in" <supremecourt@nic.in>
Cc: Seema Sapra <seemasapra@hotmail.com>, Seema Sapra <seema.sapra@gmail.com>


Complaint against Mr Montek Singh Ahluwalia for violating Section 5 of
the Official Secrets Act - by Seema Sapra, General Electric
whistleblower - Writ Petition (Civil) 1280/ 2012 – in the matter of
Seema Sapra v. General Electric Company and Others in the Delhi High
Court


To the Prime Minister of India (Shri Narendra Modi),

I have filed an affidavit in the Delhi High Court in W.P. (Civil)
1280/ 2012. Along with this affidavit as Annexure P-2, I have filed
true copies of two cables which originated from the US Embassy in
India that describe private non-official discussions and meetings
between Montek Singh Ahluwalia and the US Ambassador and other US
Embassy and US government officials.

This cables (which constitute only the tip of the iceberg of evidence
against Mr Montek Singh Ahluwalia) establish that Montek Singh
Ahluwalia is a lobbyist for US interests in India and that he has by
wrongfully sharing information with the US Embassy and US Government,
violated Section 5 of the Official Secrets Act. Montek Singh
Ahluwalia is a spy and has acted as an agent of the US government
against Indian interests.

Not only did Montek Singh Ahluwalia disclose information to US
officials in violation of Section 5 of the Official Secrets Act, he
also presented himself as an interlocuter and lobbyist for pushing
through US interests within the Indian governmental process, and he
even advised US officials/ government on how best to achieve US goals
within the Indian governmental process. Montek Singh Ahluwalia
therefore misused his official position within the Government of India
to unofficially and unlawfully help and assist the United States
government in achieving/ securing US strategic and commercial
interests in Indian governmental decision making. Mr Montek Singh
Ahluwalia is in these cables described as advising the US government
on how to gain an upper hand over Indian bureaucrats and ministers and
Indian governmental processes, and in one instance advising on how US
educational businesses can break Indian law.

These cables establish that Montek Singh Ahluwalia has advised the
United States Government against Indian strategic interests in
diplomacy and state-to-state relations. This makes Montek Singh
Ahluwalia a traitor guilty of treason.

This basically means that Montek Singh Ahluwalia is a spy acting for
the United States government. That Montek Singh Ahluwalia is a CIA
agent/ asset has been publicly articulated by several eminent Indians.

Mr Montek Singh Ahluwalia must be investigated and prosecuted for
violation of Section 5 of the Official Secrets Act and the two US
embassy cables below provide sufficient evidence of this, though
additional evidence against Mr Montek Singh Ahluwalia can be easily
gathered.

Seema Sapra



Annexure P-2


Cable reference id: #07NEWDELHI4272

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would
pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully
restricting our activities." — "Refus Global", Paul-Émile Borduas

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History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs
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Reference id

?  aka Wikileaks id #122608

Subject

Ambassador Discusses Ceo Forum Issues With Planning Commission Deputy
Chairman Ahluwalia

Origin

Embassy New Delhi (India)

Cable time

Tue, 18 Sep 2007 12:16 UTC

Classification

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Source

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/09/07NEWDELHI4272.html

History

Time unknown: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks

Wed, 6 Apr 2011 19:54: First publication, unredacted, however non-text
content differs

Fri, 26 Aug 2011 02:34: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text
content differs

Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies

O 181216Z SEP 07 FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
IMMEDIATE 8314 INFO RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI 1496 RUEHCI/AMCONSUL
KOLKATA 0853 RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE 4124 RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI 0588
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY
WASHDC RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC RUCPDOC/DEPT
OF COMMERCE WASHDC

Hide header UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 004272 SIPDIS SENSITIVE
SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEC DIRECTOR HUBBARD USDOC FOR
ITA/MAC/OSA/LDROKER/ASTERN/KRUDD DEPT OF ENERGY FOR A/S KHARBERT,
TCUTLER, CZAMUDA, RLUHAR DEPT PASS TO USTR
DHARTWICK/CLILIENFELD/AADLER DEPT PASS TO TREASURY FOR OFFICE OF SOUTH
ASIA ABAUKOL TREASURY PASS TO FRB SAN FRANCISCO/TERESA CURRAN STATE
FOR P, SCA/INS AND EB/TRA JEFFREY HORWITZ AND TOM ENGLE E.O. 12958:
N/A TAGS: EFIN [Financial and Monetary Affairs], EINV [Foreign
Investments], EPET [Petroleum and Natural Gas], ETRD [Foreign Trade],
SENV [Environmental Affairs], PREL [External Political Relations],
PARM [Arms Controls and Disarmament], TSPL [Science and Technology
Policy], KNNP [Nuclear Non-Proliferation], TRGY [Energy Technology],
IN [India; Andaman Islands; Lakshadweep Islands; Nicobar Islands]
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES CEO FORUM ISSUES WITH PLANNING
COMMISSION DEPUTY CHAIRMAN AHLUWALIA NEW DELHI 00004272 001.2 OF 002
¶1. (SBU) Summary: The Ambassador met September 14 with Planning
Commission Deputy Chairman Montek Ahluwalia to discuss the upcoming
CEO Forum, mid-October visit to India by Energy Deputy Secretary Sell
for the APP and Energy Dialogue, and the end of October visit by
Treasury Secretary Paulson and NEC Director Hubbard. Ambassador also
urged GOI resolution of the outstanding legacy issues of McDermott and
Dow Chemical. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) The Ambassador noted that the CEO
Forum was unique in that it was one of the few private sector forums
that attracted great interest and attendance from senior government
officials. It was therefore important that the September 24 discussion
focus on critical issues including infrastructure financing and the
impact of inadequate IPR protection on foreign investment in India
that has lead to the recent decision by the Swiss pharmaceutical
company, Novartis, to pull out of India after its latest patent
application was denied. Ahluwalia agreed and said that he hoped the
U.S.-India civil nuclear agreement would not be on the agenda since
the ball was in India's court to move forward in a process well known
to everyone. Ambassador noted that, at some point, prospects for U.S.
private sector investment in India's civil nuclear industry would be
an appropriate discussion topic at the CEO Forum, but not until the
Agreement had been operationalized. Ahluwalia said that he would
discuss with Foreign Secretary Menon keeping the civil nuclear
agreement off the agenda, and Ambassador said that he would take it up
with Under Secretary Burns. ¶3. (SBU) The Ambassador said that it
might be useful to repeat the formula used in last year's successful
CEO Forum by using the lunch to follow up on important economic issues
previously raised in the morning meeting, and avoid topics like civil
nuclear and the Doha Round that will accomplish little in the short
time available. Ahluwalia agreed and said that CII and the Ministry of
External Affairs had been discussing with State and the NSC the idea
of moving from one large rectangular table to several round tables
that would group CEOs and government officials according to their
interest in particular issues/topics. Ahluwalia added that the GOI
intended to present a 14 point non-paper on progress made and
remaining/new issues that could be useful for discussion and follow up
after the meeting. Ahluwalia said that Hubbard in a recent phone
conversation said that the U.S. also intended to raise
agricultural/phyto-sanitary concerns. ¶4. (SBU) The Ambassador said
that the October 29-30 visit of Treasury Secretary Paulson to India
presented a great opportunity to focus on creating a climate of
finance for infrastructure. He added that Paulson and his team will
bring great knowledge and experience on financial market supervision,
regulatory issues, securitization, debt, and other key areas.
Ahluwalia said that he will be joining the Ambassador in the October
29 Infrastructure Conference in Mumbai that Paulson and Indian Finance
Minister Chidambaram will open. Ahluwalia noted that it would be
helpful if there was some movement on U.S. approval of ICICI's and
Bank of India's long-pending U.S. bank branch applications. He added
that there was a lot of irritation in MOF over this issue, especially
since Secretary Paulson had told Chidambaram a year ago that there
would be action. Despite the lack of progress, Ahluwalia noted that
MOF had recently approved three new branches in India for Citibank.
Ambassador responded that the delay was not due to protectionism on
the U.S. part, but because of regulatory issues that required India's
establishment of an anti-money laundering/terrorist financing regime
(AML/CTF) that meets international standards. The Ambassador noted
that India had joined the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) as an
observer with the goal of full membership, which was a welcome step.
Ahluwalia asked for a one page note on outstanding issues related to
AML/CTF that he could discuss with Chidambaram before the CEO Forum.
¶5. (SBU) The Ambassador said that Deputy Secretary of Energy Clay
Sells will visit India in mid-October for the Asia Partnership Program
(APP) summit and the U.S.-India Energy Dialogue. He added that
Secretary Rice is also considering coming out for the APP. ¶6. (SBU)
Aluwalia asked what the key deadlines are for NEW DELHI 00004272 002.2
OF 002 operationalizing the Civil Nuclear Agreement. The Ambassador
said that there can be no Congressional vote until India has reached
agreement first with the IAEA, then the NSG. Given the 90 day
Congressional review requirement before a vote is possible, India
would have to conclude the first two steps by December in order to get
a vote in Congress by the end of February. After that, getting it on
the Congressional calendar next year would be much more difficult.
Ambassador added that the U.S. has been very quiet publicly on the
Agreement since July in order to avoid "stirring things up" for the
GOI as it deals with political debate here. Ahluwalia said that the
issue in India is who will blink first, Congress or the Left. For the
Left, it is clear the issue is not the 123 Agreement, but the
deepening U.S.-India relationship which they vehemently oppose.
Ahluwalia said that there are two possibilities if Congress calls the
Left's bluff: it could continue as a minority government until calling
for elections, or the Left could join with the BJP in bringing down
the government, leading to elections. In either case, Ahluwalia said
the Government is presently in a good political position to go into
elections, but it would be better to go to the polls on issues other
than the 123 Agreement. ¶7. (SBU) Returning to the CEO Forum, the
Ambassador said that McDermott International CEO Nesbitt will be
attending and there are reports that the GOI may announce at the Forum
that it is taking steps to finally resolve this long outstanding
legacy issue. Ambassador cautioned that any action that fell short of
expeditiously settling in full the Supreme Court Judgment in favor of
McDermott, such as a partial payment through the bankruptcy
proceedings, will go down badly and create major ill feelings in the
U.S. business community. The Ambassador also cited the GOI's continued
third party claims against Dow Chemical in the ongoing Bhopal land
reclamation lawsuit as a further impediment by Dow and others to
invest in India, and he asked that the GOI drop its claims against
Dow. Ahluwalia took the Ambassador's points on McDermott, noting the
importance of finally putting the issue to rest. On Dow, he said that
the GOI does not understand Dow's concern about future civil or
criminal liability since the GOI third-party claims do not suggest a
GOI presumption that Dow is responsible for the cleanup. The GOI's
problem is that the NGOs are very active and vocal in this case, and
it is very difficult for the Government to now drop its claims against
Dow. The GOI was hoping for a quick resolution of the case which would
have settled the issue, but Dow prevented this by asking for a stay in
the proceedings. Ahluwalia noted that the issue of whether a company
like Dow can be held liable for the actions of another company solely
on the basis of acquiring that company after the culpable activity
occurred is an important and novel legal issue in India that needs to
be resolved. Ahluwalia recommended that the Ambassador discuss the
issue with Finance Minister Chidambaram - a noted jurist. ¶8. (SBU)
Ambassador again stressed the importance of the financial sector in
upcoming U.S.-India discussions, noting that a central economic issue
for India is the long-term status of its financial markets. He added
that India's financial markets today have the makings for a regional
financial center, given India's huge hinterland and large and
increasing savings rates that mirror the conditions in the U.S.
banking sector a generation ago. The Ambassador said that virtually
all large U.S. banks were once domestic-centered, before they went
global. Ahluwalia agreed, noting that the GOI (with MOF and Prime
Minister approval) had just commissioned a High Level Committee on
Financial Sector Reforms, composed mostly of private sector
individuals, to make recommendations by next March on next steps in
financial sector reform. He added that, until India ends the dominance
of the State in the banking sector, there will never be a level
playing field for private or foreign banks that is necessary if India
is to establish itself as a regional financial center. MULFORD









Cable reference id: #08NEWDELHI2367

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would
pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully
restricting our activities." — "Refus Global", Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview •
History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs
diff • Donate



Reference id

?  aka Wikileaks id #168360

Subject

Ambassador Meets With Montek Singh Ahluwalia

Origin

Embassy New Delhi (India)

Cable time

Thu, 4 Sep 2008 00:59 UTC

Classification

CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN

Source

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/09/08NEWDELHI2367.html

History

Time unknown: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks

Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies

VZCZCXRO4795 OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHPW DE RUEHNE #2367/01 2480059
ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 040059Z SEP 08 FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI TO
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3233 INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND
CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUCNNSG/NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP
COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE RHEBAAA/DEPT OF
ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 1623 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN
NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 6851

Hide header C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 NEW DELHI 002367
SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/03/2028 TAGS: EAGR [Agriculture
and Forestry], ECON [Economic Conditions], EDU [European Democratic
Union], EINV [Foreign Investments], ENRG [Energy and Power], ETRD
[Foreign Trade], ETTC [Trade and Technology Controls], IN [India;
Andaman Islands; Lakshadweep Islands; Nicobar Islands], KNNP [Nuclear
Non-Proliferation], PARM [Arms Controls and Disarmament], PREL
[External Political Relations], TRGY [Energy Technology], TSPL
[Science and Technology Policy] SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH MONTEK
SINGH AHLUWALIA 1. (C) Summary. Ambassador met with Planning
Commission Deputy Chairman Montek Singh Ahluwalia on September 2 to
discuss upcoming high level bilateral meetings, including the
President-Prime Minister meeting on September 25 and the CEO Forum
scheduled for October 14. In addition, the Ambassador provided an
update to Ahluwalia on the August 22-23 Nuclear Suppliers Group
meeting in Vienna and his outlook for the second meeting scheduled for
September 4-5. End summary. AMBASSADOR REVIEWS NSG DEVELOPMENTS
----------------------------------- ¶2. (C) First, Ambassador Mulford
provided Ahluwalia an update on events at the August 21-22 Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG) Plenary in Vienna. The Ambassador expressed
disappointment and shock at the positions that many of the NSG members
took. USG officials had engaged with the NSG members in the lead-up to
the Plenary and the members had signaled that they were "supportive"
but had "concerns." The Ambassador then noted that NSG members
submitted over 60 amendments in the Vienna meeting to the draft NSG
exception that the U.S. had submitted. Ambassador Mulford observed
that the surprising number of substantial amendments nearly amounted
to a question of good faith, with key NSG members' non-proliferation
advocates allowed the upper hand. ¶3. (C) The Ambassador described to
Ahluwalia how the meeting in Vienna had 400 people ) minus the Indian
delegation that had to remain outside ) with all the chairs facing
forward toward the Chairman's desk, in a configuration that
discouraged debate and enabled NSG members to offer tough amendments
semi-anonymously. Ambassador Mulford also explained to Ahluwalia that
in the briefing with the Indian delegation ) primarily Foreign
Secretary Meno and Special Envoy Shyan Saran ) during a scheduled
break in the NSG Plenary, the Indian side solicited questions from the
NSG members. None were offered. US representative John Rood also
encouraged the participants to utilize the opportunity to ask
questions of the Indian delegation, but no one did. Looking Forward
--------------- ¶4. (C) The Ambassador then considered the next steps.
He noted that India and the US have negotiated a "clean" text, but
that he anticipates it will be an extremely hard sell in the next NSG
meeting in Vienna on September 4-5. Ambassador Mulford assured
Ahluwalia that the US goal was to try to keep the text "sacrosanct,"
with NSG member concerns limited to comments in the Chairman's
Summary. The Ambassador identified several text changes that he
thought would be unacceptable: the "multilateralization" of the Hyde
Act, and any language that demanded automatic sanctions in response to
further nuclear testing. Whether it would be possible to avoid such
language, Mulford didn't know. ¶5. (C) Secretary Rice had asked the
Ambassador to stay in Delhi during the September 4-5 Vienna Plenary to
engage the GoI if needed. Mulford noted that National Security Advisor
Narayanan had spoken with him that day and was not happy to learn that
the Ambassador would not be in Vienna to help move the deal through.
Mulford observed that one of the problems with the NSG meetings was
the representational mode )- that NSG members had designated their
non-proliferation advocates as participants at the Plenary rather than
senior political representatives who could see the big picture at
stake. The big issue for the NSG was whether the international
nonproliferation system would be stronger with India on the inside.
The US delegation on September 4-5 would be led by State Department
Under Secretary for Political Affairs Bill Burns, which added weight
to the meeting. ¶6. (C) Ambassador Mulford apprised Ahluwalia of his
discussions with the "Group of Six" like-minded country members of the
NSG ) Austria, Ireland, New Zealand, Netherlands, Norway and
Switzerland ) as well as with Canada and Japan. The Ambassador
explained that they needed to realize the importance of the NSG
exception to India. The Ambassador had pointed out to them that any
country that blocks the NSG waiver should understand that its
relationship with India would not be able to meet its maximum
potential as India was likely to start a blame game, should the NSG
NEW DELHI 00002367 002 OF 005 exception not go through. Ahluwalia
agreed that political pressure was needed to keep the focus on the big
picture. To that end, Ambassador Mulford pointed out, President Bush
and Secretary Rice were making calls to the leadership of these
countries; however, the non-proliferation issues were often emotive
for some countries. Some of the NSG representatives in Vienna had
never been to India and had an outdated view of the country and the
world today. ¶7. (C) Mulford pointed to the substantial reductions in
carbon-based emissions that would result from India,s access to
nuclear energy made possible by the civil nuclear initiative. The
Ambassador referenced an estimate that the amount of coal substituted
with nuclear energy in India over the next twenty years was equivalent
to half the amount of emissions from the state of California and more
than all of the EU25 emission cuts combined (Note: according to a
study by David Victor published by the Council on Foreign Relations,
July 18, 2006. End note). Ahluwalia responded that India,s lead
nuclear scientist, Department of Atomic Energy Chairman Dr. Anil
Kakodkar, had projected that by 2050 India's access to uranium through
the civil nuclear cooperation initiative would treble the amount of
uranium India could process and use toward nuclear energy, going from
the equivalent of 200,000 MW of power to 600,000 MW of power. But,
Ahluwalia questioned, do the nonproliferation people care? The
Ambassador responded that they apparently did not, since they went so
far as to request that the statements in the NSG waiver text referring
to the energy benefits of the deal be removed. ¶8. (C) Ahluwalia
opined that keeping the language on energy benefits in the text was
useful, if not to the NSG members, then to a larger audience that
would consider the text. The Ambassador concurred, noting that it was
important to get the text through the NSG quickly so that the
bilateral deal could move not just to Congress but also to President
Bush for needed presidential determinations. These determinations were
one-time requirements that did not need to be repeated in a new
administration. UPCOMING PRESIDENT-PRIME MINISTER MEETING
----------------------------------------- ¶9. (C) Ambassador Mulford
moved to the topic of the scheduled September 25 meeting between
President Bush and Prime Minister Singh in Washington. He asked
Ahluwalia what issues he thought the two leaders should discuss,
noting that the President was interested to know the latest on the
government's reform impulse that it indicated after winning the
confidence vote in Parliament in July. Ahluwalia started with a
longer-term observation: that the government's decision to part ways
with the Left was decided on the issue of the Indo-US civil nuclear
deal, but that the parting of ways was done with the sense of it being
a longer, durable split. In the short-term, Ahluwalia continued, there
is still the question of whether any legislative reforms can be done
before elections. He thought the most that could be done would be to
introduce the insurance amendment legislation that raises the cap on
foreign direct investment (FDI) from 26% to 49% and to pass the
pending banking amendment act that removes the limit on voting rights
of shareholders. Ahluwalia opined that introducing the insurance
legislation would be the government's signal of its commitment to
reform. He thought the banking amendment should go through, but it
mostly depends on whether the BJP signals its support, because
otherwise, the government is unlikely to be able to amass enough of
its new supporters to vote for the bill. ¶10. (C) The Deputy Chairman
also pointed to non-legislative reforms as being very possible. He
suggested that Commerce Minister Kamal Nath could do more on
investment (Note: The Commerce Ministry has the lead on the
government's FDI policy that designates most FDI caps in the country
not controlled by existing legislation. End note.) Ahluwalia also
looked to the Banking Roadmap which is supposed to be revisited by the
government and the central bank, the RBI, in 2009. He thought a new
roadmap that opened India's banking sector to more foreign
participation would not be issued until after national elections next
year. He noted that the currently scheduled October-November
parliamentary session was not very NEW DELHI 00002367 003 OF 005 long,
and that after that, there was not likely to be a substantive session
until after elections. He opined that since the deadline for a new
Parliament to be in session was May 2009, that elections would have to
be held by March. However, he noted, the election schedule would have
to work around key school exams during that part of the year. ¶11. (C)
Returning to the scope of possible reforms, Ahluwalia reiterated that
the Finance Minister wants to get the banking bill through and that on
non-legislative side, improving the investment environment through
"debugging" the "creaking machinery" of the bureaucracy would be an
important reform. The Ambassador supported the idea, noting that
several American companies , most recently Oshkosh and Sikorsky, had
been disqualified from bids just shortly before the bids were to be
opened, raising questions of transparency. Ahluwalia admitted that he
had not heard of these companies' situation. Ambassador Mulford
suggested the issue could be an agenda item for the October 14 CEO
Forum. Addressing the issue of questionable disqualifications would
help improve the business investment image of India. Ahluwalia agreed,
stressing that transparency was very important. However, he countered,
he has seen instances where foreign companies were properly
disqualified on a technicality that they knew of, yet failed to
communicate circumstances properly. Even so, the Ambassador said, it
would be a good idea not to have disqualifications occur just 1-2 days
before the opening of bids. EDUCATION FOCUS AT CEO FORUM
---------------------------- ¶12. (SBU) The Ambassador next suggested
that education collaboration might be a good agenda focus at the CEO
Forum, to which Ahluwalia agreed emphatically. Ambassador Mulford
asked about the possibility of commercial and military offsets being
used for investments in India's education sector. Ahluwalia expressed
the view that commercial offsets -- mostly generated from aviation
purchases -- were a more likely source of revenue for higher education
investments, because the Ministry of Defense is likely to use defense
procurement offsets with its captive, protected state interests. ¶13.
(SBU) Ahluwalia indicated that the Indian side is "keen" to step up
its educational dialogue with the United States and may wish to have
it included in the joint statement between the President and the Prime
Minister at their meeting in late September. He went on to suggest
that, at the October 14 CEO Forum, the CEOs could "sanctify" a plan to
move forward on education collaboration. He explained that he has been
reaching out to Indian CEOs and to prominent Indians in the US, asking
for suggestions for cooperation between Indian and American
universities. He was trying to get the Secretary of Higher Education
to the CEO Forum to help get acceptance and commitment to moving
forward on some kind of collaboration. Under Indian law, Ahluwalia
asserted, all kinds of foreign investment in education was possible
short of giving a foreign university degree. He wanted to get the CEO
Forum to "sanctify" support for enhanced cooperation and to establish
a formal framework. Ahluwalia also noted that, in addition to support
for the idea, he wanted the private sector to help pick up the costs
of exchanging students or faculty between Indian and American
universities. ¶14. (SBU) The Ambassador asked for clarification that
newly established programs could be for-profit, but Ahluwalia
explained that for-profit universities are not currently allowed in
India, based on a Supreme Court decision. But, he observed, several
states were taking the lead in developing new education efforts, such
as the Indian School of Business in Hyderabad or Haryana Chief
Minister Hooda's plan to build an education city north of Delhi.
India's private universities and schools get around the obligation to
be nonprofit institutions by establishing a trust or society that
contained hidden fees or very profitable hidden lease and other costs
passed from the nonprofit educational subsidiary to a holding
company's real estate subsidiary. ¶15. (SBU) Ahluwalia explained that
he had proposed to Bill Harrison, former CEO of JP Morgan and lead US
CEO of the CEO NEW DELHI 00002367 004 OF 005 Forum, that a subgroup be
created to identify areas of educational collaboration. He had
proposed that Infosys co-founder Nandan Nilekani be the Indian side
lead, and had asked Dan Price for suggestions on a lead from the US
side. Ahluwalia claimed that some collaborations are already underway
between US universities and the Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs)
and of Management (IIMs), India's premier universities. In fact,
Ahluwalia asserted, it would not be a problem for US universities to
identify an Indian university partner, where each side would send
students for a part of the home program to study in the partner
university and recognize the credits of each other towards the home
degree. ¶16. (SBU) Embassy Public Affairs Counselor Schwartz asked
whether Ahluwalia had ideas for specific deliverables that could be
announced at the CEO Forum or proposed actions for the Education
Working Group. Ahluwalia opined that there might be a limited
deliverable, such as announcing that Nandan Nilekani and a US
counterpart as co-chairs of a group to provide a report to both
governments after the Indian elections. Schwartz asked whether a
previously discussed idea, the creation of a junior faculty
development program, perhaps funded by commercial offsets, could be
kicked off at the CEO Forum working group meeting. Ahluwalia thought
that was a good idea, adding that there was no doubt that a report
from the CEO Forum working group to pinpoint the use of offsets would
find a lot of takers and proposed that the idea of offsets be cast as
a note of suggestion, along with other suggestions, for review by
Nilekani's group. (Comment: Ahluwalia's suggestion sidestepped
Schwartz's proposal of obtaining GOI government approval for the use
of offsets by simply incorporating it as an area of study for the
newly formed group. End comment.) ¶17. (SBU) Schwartz suggested that
another deliverable might be the establishment of a US - India Higher
Education Council, which ECA Assistant Secretary Goli Ameri had agreed
to fund during her recent trip to India. The Council would be housed
for simplicity at the Fulbright Commission which has a bilateral Board
of Directors and serve as a regular consultative body for educators,
along with their supporters in government and industry. Ahluwalia
thought that made "a lot of sense," and suggested that in advance of
the CEO Forum meeting, it would be good to discuss the idea with MEA
Joint Secretary Gaitri Kumar and CII leader Tarun Das. DE-CONSTRUCTING
DOHA -------------------- ¶18. (C) Ambassador Mulford lastly noted to
Ahluwalia that President Bush might wish to discuss with Prime
Minister Singh the recent failed mini-Ministerial in Geneva on the
Doha Round. Mulford asked Ahluwalia if he thought it worth raising, to
which Ahluwalia replied that anything that the President felt should
be raised would be fine and in fact the two had often exchanged views
on Doha before. Further, Ahluwulia felt that if the US judged there
was the possibility of movement, then a discussion at the Bush-Singh
level would be especially useful. Ahluwalia noted that he had not yet
received a full briefing from the Indian delegation, but that Joint
Secretary Gopal Krisha was scheduled to come over during the week to
discuss with him. However, Ahluwalia said that he had heard from the
US National Security Council's Dan Price on the August meeting.
Ahluwalia understood that the breaking point had been over the special
safeguard mechanism (SSM). The Indian view, Ahluwalia believed, was
that the 40% increase in imports as the threshold trigger for raising
tariff rates was too high. As an economist, Ahluwalia opined, he
didn't understand why the percentage of imports had been used. More
relevant, he asserted, was the size of imports to the economy. The
larger the importance of imports to the economy, the more important a
small increase in imports was. ¶19. (C) Ahluwalia further offered that
his limited understanding from the Indian side was that U.S. Trade
Representative (USTR) Susan Schwab had hardened the US position on SSM
and would not consider a compromise proposal that would have phased in
an increase in the import increase trigger. The Ambassador quickly
countered that the US perceived that India had hardened its stance on
SSM after Commerce Minister Nath had returned to Geneva from the July
NEW DELHI 00002367 005 OF 005 21 Confidence Vote in the Indian
Parliament, and that the change was unexpected. Ahluwalia replied
indirectly, noting that India's view of the SSM was that since the
main proposal for the Doha bound rates was so similar to the rates
from the Uruguay Round that the SSM only applied to Uruguay products
with no margins. The key question was what should be the trigger for
raising tariffs under the SSM? Economic Counselor Davison explained
that SSM was very important to US agricultural interests. Many of them
felt that without the SSM, the US concessions on agriculture were too
much. They felt the overall package would not have resulted in
increased and predictable access to Indian markets. ¶20. (C) As the
meeting drew to a close, Ahluwalia reiterated that he agreed with the
Ambassador that the President and Prime Minister should discuss Doha
at their meeting. Ahluwalia thought there was maybe a communication
issue that could be addressed. The Indian government, he assured the
Ambassador, was not taking the view that there was nothing there at
Doha for India. If there are small points where re-thinking and
clarification could be made, and USTR Schwab and Minister Nath were to
meet again before the President-PM meeting, then it would be useful to
know what the US needs are. If it is just this "SSM thing" of choosing
between either no SSM until 40% or creating a lower, graduating
trigger, Ahluwalia concluded, then it did not seem to be a major
difference. MULFORD MULFORD

Complaint against Mr Montek Singh Ahluwalia for conflict of interest and corruption while holding Government of India posts including when he was the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission - by Seema Sapra, General Electric whistleblower, who has filed Writ Petition (Civil) 1280/ 2012 (in the matter of Seema Sapra v. General Electric Company and Others in the Delhi High Court)

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Seema Sapra <seema.sapra@googlemail.com>
Date: Mon, Aug 18, 2014 at 2:01 PM
Subject: Complaint against Mr Montek Singh Ahluwalia for conflict of
interest and corruption while holding Government of India posts
including when he was the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission -
by Seema Sapra, General Electric whistleblower, who has filed Writ
Petition (Civil) 1280/ 2012 (in the matter of Seema Sapra v. General
Electric Company and Others in the Delhi High Court)
To: fmo@nic.in, bhushansinha@nic.in, Satya Pal Bhatia
<spbhatia777@gmail.com>, raj parshad vats <rpvats2@gmail.com>,
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Cc: Seema Sapra <seemasapra@hotmail.com>, Seema Sapra <seema.sapra@gmail.com>


Complaint against Mr Montek Singh Ahluwalia for conflict of interest
and corruption while holding Government of India posts including when
he was the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission - by Seema
Sapra, General Electric whistleblower, who has filed Writ Petition
(Civil) 1280/ 2012 (in the matter of Seema Sapra v. General Electric
Company and Others in the Delhi High Court)


To the Prime Minister of India (Shri Narendra Modi),

1. Mr Montek Singh Ahluwalia was the Deputy Chairman of the
Planning Commission and sat in all Cabinet meetings and was invited to
all Government of India Committee meetings on economic and financial
policy matters. He issued press/ public statements everyday on almost
every economic policy matter of the Central Government. He had been
charged with having a finger in every pie. A study of his press
statements and news reports about the Planning Commission discloses
the latter's interference in government matters of several ministries.
The Planning Commission was de-facto interfering in government
matters, processes and decisions that fell within the domain of
Central government ministries. Mr Montek Singh Ahluwalia'a statements
on government policy and on executive decisions were capable of and in
fact affected stock prices of firms listed in India and overseas.



2. Mr Montek Singh Ahluwalia's elder son, Mr Pavan Ahluwalia has
worked with McKinsey, and later with a Hedge Fund (Old Lane)
established by Mr Vikram Pandit and subsequently taken over by
Citigroup.



3. Mr Pavan Ahluwalia presently manages an India based/ focused
hedge/investment fund (Laburnum Capital) that is registered with SEBI
as a portfolio manager. This hedge fund was established in 2009 with
assets under management (AUM) exceeding Rs. 100 crore. The assets
under present management with Laburnum Capital are most likely
significantly higher than Rs. 100 crore.



4. Laburnum Capital operates in complete secrecy with no public
disclosure of the source or destination of the large amounts of funds
moving in and out of its accounts. The website of Laburnum Capital
claims that it manages investments for several high-net worth Indians,
business houses, corporate and business families.



5. A court document filed for Mr Rajat Gupta's sentencing
hearing before the United States District Court refers to an admission
by Mr Pavan Ahluwalia to his close relationship with his former boss
at McKinsey (Rajat Gupta) who has also invested funds with Mr Pavan
Ahluwalia in Laburnum Capital.



6. Mr Pavan Ahluwalia's entire career has placed him in conflict
of interest situations with his father, Mr Montek Singh Ahluwalia's
career and role in the Indian government. After graduating from
Princeton, Mr Pavan Ahluwalia appears to have worked with McKinsey
both in New York and in India. The time period includes the late 1990s
and the first half of the 2000s. At this time, Mr Pavan Ahluwalia
possessed a basic economic degree. During this time, Rajat Gupta was
heading McKinsey and McKinsey made significant inroads into Indian
policymaking with government engagements at both the Central and State
levels and with significant private business engagements focused on
India. (Rajat Gupta left McKinsey in 2007.) There are documented
reports that during this period, Mr Montek Singh Ahluwalia was a
strong supporter of McKinsey in India and actively recommended
McKinsey's highly priced consulting services to several government
departments/ ministries (see Deccan Herald report dated September 24,
2004). Mr Montek Singh Ahluwalia had even appointed McKinsey on
official Planning Commission committees in 2004 for a mid-term
appraisal of the 10th plan. During this time, Mr Pavan Ahluwalia was
employed by McKinsey and received a lucrative salary.



7. McKinsey's private clients at any given time are kept confidential.



8. During the time that Mr Pavan Ahluwalia worked for McKinsey,
Mr Rajat Gupta developed and enjoyed unrestricted access to top Indian
government functionaries including to Prime Minister, Mr Manmohan
Singh.



9. In 2005, Mr Pavan Ahluwalia obtained a graduate degree from
Harvard Business School after leaving McKinsey.



10. A document in Rajat Gupta's sentencing hearing (Case
1:11-cr-00907-JSR Document 123 Filed 10/17/12) contains the following
statement from Mr Pavan Ahluwalia:



"Pavan Ahluwalia, who in 2006 was being recruited to return to McKinsey from

graduate school, writes that "[a]t the insistence of [a] McKinsey
partner, I had a telephone conversation with Rajat, expecting to have
to defend my reasons for not returning to the firm. To my considerable
surprise, he listened intently, understood why I was making the
decision I was making [not to return], and told me that he objectively
thought it was the correct decision for me. Rather than try to 'sell'
his firm, or score a point in the recruiting process . . . he was able
to put my own concerns front and center and evaluate the decision from
my perspective.

"Over the years that followed . . . I found him to be and incredibly
generous and wise mentor. . . . [H]e went out of his way to introduce
me to people, and when I decided to start my own investment firm, he
became one of my first investors, as he had been for several young
McKinsey alumni starting off on their own.

"Rajat never once mentioned money or wealth creation while discussing
either his own involvement in principal investing or my career
choices."



11. This statement shows that Mr Rajat Gupta continued to be
"incredibly generous in helping Mr Pavan Ahluwalia's career even after
the latter left McKinsey by introducing him to important people and by
even investing funds with Mr Pavan Ahluwalia's investment firm,
Laburnum Capital.



12. In 2006, after graduate school, Mr Pavan Ahluwalia joined Old
Lane, a hedge fund launched by Mr Vikram Pandit, who would later head
Citigroup. Old Lane was subsequently acquired by Citigroup.



13. Old Lane had substantial India focused investments/ activities
during the time that Mr Pavan Ahluwalia was employed by Old Lane.



14. One significant investment by Old Lane in India was in the Maytas
group, a group affiliated to the scam ridden Satyam group. Maytas won
the lucrative contract for the Hyderabad metro soon after Old Lane's
investment in Maytas. The contract for the Hyderbad metro awarded to
Maytas was later disclosed as a scam and Mr Montek Singh Ahluwalia's
role in the formulation and award of this contract has been
highlighted in his lack of adequate response to Mr E Sreedharan's
letter highlighting serious concerns with this contract. A document
filed in Writ Petition No 18483 of 2008 in the Andhra Pradesh High
Court challenging this contract refers to a letter dated 25 July 2008
written by Mr Montek Singh Ahluwalia to the Prime Minister (Dr
Manmohan Singh) that disclosed that Mr Montek Singh Ahluwalia
anticipated the award of the contract to Maytas even before the
successful bidder was formally announced.



15. Old Lane also invested in the KVK group of companies (KVK Energy
and Infrastructure) which was awarded the 1,200Mw KVK Nilachal power
project in Orissa. Old Lane funds were also used by Hyderabad-based
KVK Energy and Infrastructure Ltd (KEIL) to buy back all the Rs 45
crore equity (25.5%) held by the troubled Maytas Infra in KVK Nilachal
Power Ltd after concerns were raised about Maytas stake in the power
project. KVK raised Rs 106 crore from Old Lane India Opportunities
Fund in October 2007 and later raised an additional US$20 million from
Old Lane (approximately Rs 100 crore).



16. KVK Nilachal first signed an MoU with the Orissa state government
on September 26, 2006 for 600 MW, which was enhanced to 1200 MW
through the supplementary MoU signed on October 17, 2008 for setting
up the power plant at Rahangol village in Cuttack district at a cost
of Rs 5,000 crore. KVK Nilachal was to finally set up three units of
350 MW coal-fired power plant at a total cost of Rs 4,500 crore. Mr
Hari Aiyer was appointed as nominee director on the Board of KVK
Energy. He was a Founder-Member of Old Lane Partners, and also
Chairman & Advisor, India Opportunities Advisors Pvt. Ltd., and the
Indian Advisor for Old Lane India Opportunities Fund.



17. Mr Hari Aiyar is also the Managing Partner of Build India Capital
Advisors (BIC). Citi's joint venture India infrastructure business,
was according to its website, established to seek long-term capital
growth potential within India's Infrastructure sector by managing the
risks particular to greenfield/brownfield development infrastructure
projects. The website of Build India Capital Advisors states: "Driven
by high demand, financing shortages and implementation constraints,
BIC's investment team, which possesses extensive investment expertise
in major sub-sectors such as power, roads, ports/logistics, airports,
development of land and real estate infrastructure, believes there is
a unique opportunity for investments within India's burgeoning private
sector."



18. Old Lane had special Indian focussed funds including the Old Lane
India Opportunities Fund, established in July 2006, and sized at $518
million with a 10-year life. This fund was dedicated for long-term
investment opportunities in India, primarily in the infrastructure and
real estate sectors. There was an Old Lane Mauritius fund for
investments into India.



19. There is no transparency about whose money was being invested in
India by Old Lane and also about what contributions and deals resulted
from Mr Pavan Ahluwalia's employment at Old Lane. There is also no
transparency about the compensation that Mr Pavan Ahluwalia earned
from Old Lane during his time there.



20. Mr Montek Singh Ahluwalia has been a significant and very vocal
proponent of private investment in Indian infrastructure in his
capacity as a policymaker and as participant in important
infrastructure related executive decisions for the government of
India. Yet during his two tenures as Deputy Chairman of the Planning
Commission, he wasin direct conflict of interest situations on account
of his son, Mr Pavan Ahluwalia roles at Old Lane and later at Laburnum
Capital.



21. Old Lane (which was set up in 2006) was acquired by Citigroup in
2007 and if Mr Pavan Ahluwalia worked for Old Lane between 2007 and
2009 (as it appears he did), then Pavan Ahluwalia was, during this
period, a Citigroup employee.



22. In 2007, Mr Montek Singh Ahluwalia was appointed to the Group of
30. (Mr Montek Singh Ahluwalia has since then left this group.)
Established in 1978, the Group of Thirty is a "private, nonprofit,
international body composed of very senior representatives of the
private and public sectors and academia." Its stated aim is "deepen
understanding of international economic and financial issues, to
explore the international repercussions of decisions taken in the
public and private sectors, and to examine the choices available to
market practitioners and policymakers." The groups website describes
its influence as impacting "the current and future structure of the
global financial system by delivering actionable recommendations
directly to the private and public policymaking communities." This
association with the Group of 30 by Mr Montek Singh Ahluwalia also
raises conflict of interest concerns.



24. A January 4, 2007 Asian Age news report reported that Mr Montek
Singh Ahluwalia at that time was also a member of the Commission on
Growth and Development set up by
the World Bank and the Institute of International Finance (The Global
Association of Financial Institutions). According to the Asian Age
report the "Institute of International
Finance has included Dr Ahluwalia in the group of trustees for
overseeing the "principles for stable capital flows and fair debt
restructuring in emerging markets". The Commission on Growth and
Development (informally known as the Growth Commission) is described
on the website of the World Bank in the following terms:



"Launched in April 2006, the Commission on Growth and Development
brings together twenty-two leading practitioners from government,
business and the policymaking arenas, mostly from the developing
world. The Commission is chaired by Nobel Laureate Michael Spence,
former Dean of the Stanford Graduate Business School, and Danny
Leipziger, former Vice-President, World Bank, is the Commission's
Vice-Chair.

Over a period of four years the Commission sought to gather the best
understanding there was about the policies and strategies that
underlay rapid and sustained economic growth and poverty reduction.
The Commission's audience is the leaders of developing countries.

The Commission was supported by the Governments of Australia, Sweden,
the Netherlands, and United Kingdom, the William and Flora Hewlett
Foundation, and the World Bank.

Motivation

The Commission has been brought together by the belief that the
world's challenges - poverty, environment, misunderstandings within
and between nations, vast differences in living standards within and
across countries - are best met in conditions of rising and sustained
prosperity, and expanding economic opportunities.

The Commission was established "to take stock of the state of
theoretical and empirical knowledge on economic growth with a view to
drawing implications for policy for the current and next generation of
policymakers."

…

The Commission was funded by the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation,
the governemnts of Australia, Netherlands, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom, and the World Bank."



25. While Mr Montek Singh Ahluwalia's participation in the Commission
on Growth and Development raises certain questions about whether he
obtained prior Government authorisation and whether his participation
was in his personal capacity or as a representative of the Government
of India, Mr Montek Singh Ahluwalia's association with the Institute
of International Finance was clearly a case of conflict of interest
and more so, because his son – Mr Pavan Ahluwalia, was at that time
employed by Vikram Pandit/ Citigroup.



26. The mission statement of the Institute of International Finance
(of which Citigroup would be a constituent) reads:

The Institute of International Finance, Inc. (IIF), is the world's
only global association of financial institutions. Created in 1983 in
response to the international debt crisis, the IIF has evolved to meet
the changing needs of the financial community. Members include most of
the world's largest commercial banks and investment banks, as well as
a growing number of insurance companies and investment management
firms. Among the Institute's members are commercial and investment
banks, sovereign wealth funds, asset managers, hedge funds, insurance
companies, multinational corporations, law firms, export credit
agencies, multilateral agencies, development banks, and other
organizations providing products and services to financial services
community. The Institute currently has over 450 members headquartered
in more than 70 countries in Africa, the Middle East, North and South
America, Europe, and Asia.

Mission

The Institute of International Finance is committed to being the most
influential global association of financial institutions. We strive to
sustain and enhance our distinctive role on the basis of the
professional excellence of our research, the unmatched breadth of our
membership, our extensive relationships with policymakers and
regulators, and the strength of our governance.

Our mission is to support the financial industry in prudently managing
risks, including sovereign risk; in developing best practices and
standards; and in advocating regulatory, financial, and economic
policies that are in the broad interest of our members and foster
global financial stability.

Main Activities

In fulfilling this mission, the IIF's main activities are to:



· Provide high-quality, timely, and impartial analysis and research to
our members on emerging markets and other central issues in global
finance.



· Systematically identify, analyze, and shape regulatory, financial,
and economic policy issues of relevance to our members globally or
regionally.



· Develop and advance representative views and constructive proposals
that influence the public debate on particular policy proposals,
including those of multilateral agencies, and broad themes of common
interest to participants in global financial markets.



· Work with policymakers, regulators, and multilateral organizations
to strengthen the efficiency, transparency, stability and
competitiveness of the global financial system, with an emphasis on
voluntary market-based approaches to crisis prevention and management.



· Promote the development of sound financial systems, with an emphasis
on emerging markets.



· Provide a network for members to exchange views and offer
opportunities for effective dialogue among policymakers, regulators,
and private sector financial institutions.



· Define, articulate, and disseminate best practices and industry
standards in such areas as risk management and analysis, disclosure,
corporate governance and regulatory compliance.



· Support education and training efforts of our members in priority areas."







27. The Public Health Foundation of India is another example of
unsavoury and undesirable links between McKinsey and Mr Montek Singh
Ahluwalia. There are several controversies surrounding the PHFI which
are not covered by this note. PHFI's bank account is with Citibank.
PHFI's status as a public authority or a private entity is in doubt.
The CIC has called PHFI a public authority and had stated that a
contrary opinion would cast doubt on the integrity of public officials
on the PHFI board like Mr Montek Singh Ahluwalia. The PHFI itself
contended that Mr Montek Singh Ahluwalia was part of PHFI in his
private capacity. The constitution of PHFI raises many conflict of
interest questions quite apart from Mr Montek Singh Ahluwalia.



28. According to its website, PHFI's legal status is as follows:



"The Public Health Foundation of India ("PHFI"/ "the Foundation") was
registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 vide
registration certificate number 54840 dated 8 February 2006.

PHFI has been granted an exemption under section 12A of the Income Tax
Act, 1961, vide letter number DIT(E)/12A/2005-06/P-1044/05/313 dated
16 June 2006. The Foundation has also obtained exemption u/s
80G(5)(vi) of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

The Foundation has been registered under the Foreign Contribution
(Regulation) Act, 1976 for carrying out activities of social nature
with registration number 231660927 dated 26 September 2008.

PHFI has been registered as a Scientific and Industrial Research
Organisation (SIRO) by the Department of Scientific and Industrial
Research under the Scheme on Recognition of Scientific and Industrial
Research Organisations (SIROs), 1988 Vide No. 14/482/2008-TU-V dated
23 April, 2011 for the period from 1 April 2011 to 31 March 2014."



29. OECD guidelines titled "Managing Conflict of Interest in the
Public Service" dated 2003, recognize that family interests can create
a potential conflict of interest situation for public officials.
Reproduced below are extracts from these OECD guidelines:



"A "conflict of interest" is:

A conflict between the public duty and private interests of public
officials, in which public officials have private-capacity interests
which could improperly influence the performance of their official
duties and responsibilities.



A sound conflict-of-interest policy pays particular attention to:

● Policy-makers and public office holders working in the most senior positions.



The financial or pecuniary interests of officials are generally
considered as the principal causes of conflict of interest. However, a
forward-looking policy should also describe examples of other causes,
such as related-party business undertakings, personal relationships
and non-financial personal interests that can be relevant in a very
complex public sector environment. In addition, affiliations with
for-profit or non-profit organisations, or with political or
professional organisations, can also give rise to new and difficult
examples of conflict. Public organisations have the primary
responsibility to define particular situations and activities that are
incompatible with their public function.



Organisational procedures should enable public officials to identify
and disclose relevant private interests that potentially conflict with
their official duties. Such procedures should make public officials
aware that they must promptly disclose all relevant information about
a conflict when taking up office (initial disclosure), and later, when
relevant circumstances change (inservice disclosure). An effective
disclosure process ensures that the responsibility for providing
sufficient details on the conflicting interest rests with individual
officials, and this requirement is explicitly communicated in
employment and appointment arrangements and contracts.



Organisations need to consider reviewing existing management
arrangements on a regular basis, to assess whether they remain
adequate in recognizing potential risk areas. Changing practices and
expectations, for example in areas such as additional employment and
"outside" appointments, post-public employment, use of "inside"
information, public contracts, new forms of gifts and other benefits,
and different family and community expectations in a multicultural
context, can generate new forms of risk.



New forms of relationship have developed between the public sector and
the business and non-profit sectors, giving rise for example to
increasingly close forms of collaboration such as public/private
partnerships, selfregulation, interchanges of personnel, and
sponsorships. New forms of employment in the public sector have also
emerged with potential for changes to traditional employment
obligations and loyalties. In consequence, there is clearly an
emerging potential for new forms of conflict of interest involving an
individual official's private interests and public duties, and growing
public concern has put pressure on governments to ensure that the
integrity of official decision-making is not compromised.



While a conflict of interest is not ipso facto corruption, there is
increasing recognition that conflicts between the private interests
and public duties of public officials, if inadequately managed, can
result in corruption. The proper objective of an effective
conflict-of-interest policy is not the simple prohibition of all
private-capacity interests on the part of public officials, even if
such an approach were conceivable. The immediate objective should be
to maintain the integrity of official policy and administrative
decisions and of public management generally, recognising that an
unresolved conflict of interest may result in abuse of public office.



This objective can generally be achieved by ensuring that public
bodies possess and implement relevant policy standards for promoting
integrity, effective processes for identifying risk and dealing with
emergent conflicts of interest, appropriate external and internal
accountability mechanisms, and management approaches – including
sanctions – that aim to ensure that public officials take personal
responsibility for complying with both the letter and the spirit of
such standards.



A "conflict of interest" involves a conflict between the public duty
and private interests of a public official, in which the public
official has private-capacity interests which could improperly
influence the performance of their official duties and
responsibilities.



Where a private interest has in fact compromised the proper
performance of a public official's duties, that specific situation is
better regarded as an instance of misconduct or "abuse of office", or
even an instance of corruption, rather than as a "conflict of
interest".



In this definition, "private interests" are not limited to financial
or pecuniary interests, or those interests which generate a direct
personal benefit to the public official. A conflict of interest may
involve otherwise legitimate private-capacity activity, personal
affiliations and associations, and family interests, if those
interests could reasonably be considered likely to influence
improperly the official's performance of their duties. A special case
is constituted by the matter of post-public office employment for a
public official: the negotiation of future employment by a public
official prior to leaving public office is widely regarded as a
conflict-of-interest situation.



Public officials should avoid private-capacity action which could
derive an improper advantage from "inside information" obtained in the
course of official duties, where the information is not generally
available to the public, and are required not to misuse their position
and government resources for private gain.



Supporting transparency and scrutiny

● Public officials and public organisations are expected to act in a
manner that will bear the closest public scrutiny. This obligation is
not fully discharged simply by acting within the letter of the law; it
also entails respecting broader public service values such as
disinterestedness, impartiality and integrity.

● Public officials' private interests and affiliations that could
compromise the disinterested performance of public duties should be
disclosed appropriately, to enable adequate control and management of
a resolution.

● Public organisations and officials should ensure consistency and an
appropriate degree of openness in the process of resolving or managing
a conflict-of-interest situation.

● Public officials and public organisations should promote scrutiny of
their management of conflict-of-interest situations, within the
applicable legal framework.



More focused examples of unacceptable conduct and relationships should
be provided for those groups that are working in at-risk areas, such
as the public-private sector interface, government procurement,
regulatory and inspectorial functions, and government contracting.
Specific attention needs to be given to functions which are subject to
close public scrutiny or media attention.



Review "at-risk" areas for potential conflict-of-interest situations

a) Additional employment – Define the circumstances, including the
required authorisation procedures, under which public officials may
engage in ancillary ("outside") employment while retaining their
official position.

b) "Inside" information – Make sure that information collected or held
by public organisations which is not in the public domain, or
information obtained in confidence in the course of official
functions, is understood to be privileged, and is effectively
protected from improper use or disclosure.

c) Contracts – Consider the circumstances in which the preparation,
negotiation, management, or enforcement of a contract involving the
public organisation could be compromised by a conflict of interest on
the part of a public official within the public organisation.

d) Gifts and other forms of benefit – Consider whether the
organisation's current policy is adequate in recognising conflicts of
interest arising from traditional and new forms of gifts or benefits.

e) Family and community expectations – Consider whether the
organisation's current policy is adequate in recognising conflicts of
interest arising from expectations placed on public officials by their
family and community, especially in a multicultural context.

f) "Outside" appointments – Define the circumstances, including the
required authorisation procedures, under which a public official may
undertake an appointment on the board or controlling body of, for
example, a community group, an NGO, a professional or political
organisation, another government entity, a government-owned
corporation, or a commercial organization which is involved in a
contractual, regulatory, partnership, or sponsorship arrangement with
their employing organisation.

g) Activity after leaving public office – Define the circumstances,
including the required authorisation procedures, under which a public
official who is about to leave public office may negotiate an
appointment or employment or other activity, where there is potential
for a conflict of interest involving the organisation."



"Where an official has failed to declare a relevant interest
situation, or has allowed a conflict-of-interest situation to continue
unresolved, or has in fact allowed a private-capacity interest to
improperly influence the performance of their duties, the definition
provided by the Guidelines encourages clarification of what is
actually at stake. For example, where the official concerned has
failed to declare a relevant interest, the draft Guidelines suggest
that such a situation would be better regarded as an instance of
misconduct, and not as a simple "conflict of interest". By contrast,
where an official has acted improperly or corruptly so as to receive a
bribe or to give an illegitimate advantage to a family member (etc.),
it would be preferable to treat the matter as "abuse of office", or as
corruption (depending on the specific circumstances), rather than as a
conflict-of interest situation, even though a conflict of interest was
fundamental to the corrupt conduct.



In this definition, "private interests" are not limited to financial
or pecuniary interests, or those of direct personal benefit to the
official. Personal affiliations or relationships, debts and other
obligations, religious or ethnic associations, professional and
party-political alignments, and family interests, may come within the
scope of the definition if those interests could reasonably be
considered as likely to influence improperly the official's
performance of their duties."



30. Several OCED countries also include extra-occupational activities
within the definition of a potential conflict of interest.



31. Another example of conflict of interest involves Dr Isher
Ahluwalia who is married to Mr Montek Singh Ahluwalia. Dr Isher
Ahluwalia was appointed Chairperson of a government committee
constituted in May 2008 called the High Powered Expert Committee for
estimating the investment requirements for urban infrastructure
services. The final report was released in March 2011. The McKinsey
Global Institute published a report in April 2010 titled "India's
urban awakening: building exclusive cities, sustaining economic
growth". This report was described as the result of a study also
commenced by McKinsey in 2008. The McKinsey report thanked members of
McKinsey's academic advisory committee for this project which included
Dr Isher Ahluwalia and three others. The McKinsey report attracted a
lot of publicity for McKinsey and presumably resulted in several new
business engagements. Dr Isher Ahluwalia's contemporaneous association
with and advice to McKinsey's project on urban development while she
was Chairperson of a High Powered Government of India Expert Committee
for estimating the investment requirements for urban infrastructure
services was a clear case of conflict of interest.



32. Mr Montek Singh Ahluwalia's younger son, Mr Aman Ahluwalia is a
lawyer practicing in Delhi. Mr Aman Ahluwalia's wife, Ms Shilpa
Mankar, is also a lawyer and is a partner in the Banking practice at
the law-firm, Amarchand Mangaldas. This family connection again raises
a conflict of interest concern regarding Mr Montek Singh Ahluwalia as
he played a key role in formulating and implementing banking and
financial policies in the Government of India.



33. Even more curious is Mr Montek Singh Ahluwalia's association
with the International Center for Alternative Dispute Resolution
(ICADR). ICADR functions under the Ministry of Law & Justice,
Department of Legal Affairs, Government of India. The ICADR website
introduces the organization as follows:

"The justice dispensing system in India has come under great stress
for several reasons, chief of them being the huge pendency of cases in
courts underlining the need for Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)
methods. The Government of India thought it necessary to provide a new
forum and procedure for resolving international and domestic
commercial disputes quickly.
The ICADR is an autonomous organization working under the aegis of the
Ministry of Law & Justice, Govt. of India with its headquarters at New
Delhi and Regional Centres at Hyderabad and Bengaluru. The Regional
Centres of ICADR are fully funded and supported by the respective
State Governments.
The Chief Justice of India is the Patron of ICADR. At the regional
level, the Chief Justice of the concerned High Court is the Patron of
the Regional Centre of ICADR. Dr. H.R.Bhardwaj, Former Union Minister
for Law & Justice, Government of India is the Chairman of ICADR. The
Governing Council of ICADR comprises of several eminent personalities
drawn from various fields."





34. The Governing Council of ICADR comprises of a long list of
persons including Mr Montek Singh Ahluwalia, some well-known and
influential lawyers, and the law Secretary. Mr Montek Singh
Ahluwalia's presence in the governing council of ICADR is very
surprising. It appears that Mr Montek Singh Ahluwalia is extending his
influence into legal circles in order to help his son, Mr Aman
Ahluwalia's career as a lawyer.



35. Even a cursory survey of news reports about Mr Montek Singh
Ahluwalia (who incidentally garnered more press coverage than any of
his colleagues in the UPA Government including the then Prime
Minister) shows that Mr Montek Singh Ahluwalia routinely commented on/
lobbied for government policy issues and government decisions that did
not fall within his domain as Deputy Chairman of the Planning
Commission. Several of such interventions by Mr Montek Singh Ahluwalia
raise serious conflict of interest concerns.



36. Mr Montek Singh Ahluwalia used official government resources for
his extra-occupational activities and for his private interests
including those of his immediate family.



37. As an example, during a trip to the United States in June 2009
(around the time that Mr Pavan Ahluwalia was engaged in transitioning
from Old Lane to his own investment firm, Laburnum Capital), Mr Montek
Singh Ahluwalia addressed investors in New York as part of a USIBC
meeting (See Business Standard article dated June 29, 2009). Mr
Montek Singh Ahluwalia had travelled to Washington DC to participate
in a meeting of the High Level Commission on the Modernization of
World Bank Group Governance. Addressing investors and asking them to
invest in India is not the job of the Deputy Chairman of the Planning
Commission. It would be relevant to determine how many of the
investors addressed by Mr Montek Singh Ahluwalia during this trip
invested in his son, Mr Pavan Ahluwalia's hedge fund.



38. Mr Montek Singh Ahluwalia's role in approving the Enron Dabhol
project (for which act of corruption the Indian exchequer continues to
pay the price) has already been highlighted.



39. The Government of India and Indian citizens should note that
while Mr Montek Singh Ahluwalia touted private investment in Indian
infrastructure, his own son, Mr Pavan Ahluwalia was a direct
beneficiary of such investment opportunities for the private sector in
Indian infrastructure. The Planning Commission under Mr Montek Singh
Ahluwalia set up a High Level Committee on Financing Infrastructure.
This Committee proposed that private equity funds and venture
capitalists could be permitted to be part of bidding consortia for
infrastructure projects. Again Mr Pavan Ahluwalia runs such a private
equity fund and Mr Montek Singh Ahluwalia's role involved clear
conflict of interest and corruption.



40. Even Mr Pavan Ahluwalia's engagement under a World Bank funded
Project on privatization of water supply in Delhi several years ago
was the subject of conflict of interest concerns because of Mr Montek
Singh Ahluwalia's connections to the World Bank.





41. Mr Montek Singh Ahluwalia has throughout his career displayed a
brazen attitude towards and has openly flouted basic principles of
good governance and conflict of interest. His conduct would never have
been tolerated in an OECD country with their strict laws about
conflict of interest and public officials.



42. I have reproduced the above complaints, facts and evidence against
Mr Montek Singh Ahluwalia in
Annexure P-3 to CM 1223/ 2013 in W.P. (Civil) 1280/ 2012 filed in the
Delhi High Court in the matter of Seema Sapra v General Electric
Company and Others. This writ petition is pending before the Delhi
High Court and the next date of hearing is 25 September 2014. The PMO
is a respondent in this writ petition and has been issued notice by
the Delhi High Court.



43. The above facts raise serious concerns of corruption facilitated
by Mr Montek Singh Ahluwalia and these need to be investigated in
accordance with law.



Seema Sapra